

**DIVERSITY AND  
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION**  
CHARLES KRAUTHAMMER  
STANLEY KURTZ

the week

# Standard

FEBRUARY 10, 2003 • \$3.95



## The Liberator

Baghdad ... and Beyond

Bush Zeroes In BY FRED BARNES

The End of Appeasement BY MAX BOOT

While Clinton Slept BY REUEL MARC GERECHT

Daschle Loses It BY STEPHEN F. HAYES

Morality in Foreign Policy BY WILLIAM KRISTOL



# SEEKING SECURITY IN A WIRED WORLD

In the past few years, the world has learned an unpleasant lesson: the Internet is not only a wonderful tool for education, productivity and entertainment, but also a powerful weapon for fraud, theft and vandalism.

Computer break-ins and online attacks are a major problem, although no one knows exactly how big, since many incidents go unreported. One nationwide survey tallied more than \$455 million in damages last year alone.

A year ago, Microsoft committed to making its software more secure as part of a drive for Trustworthy Computing. While security is never absolute, we have made changes that enable customers to strengthen it, and we have built a foundation for further improvement in future products.

**Secure By Design.** Last year, more than 11,000 Microsoft engineers received intensive training in the latest techniques for enhancing security in software code. For example, they learned threat modeling, a standard practice in the design of military weapons that involves simulating attacks to help identify vulnerabilities and devise countermeasures.

Engineers spent several weeks reviewing many millions of lines of code in Windows. This unprecedented effort has already paid off in software updates that have closed security gaps.

**Secure By Default.** Our software incorporates increasingly powerful security tools, but it gives customers wide latitude to activate

features and set security options as they see fit. One change we have made is to configure software to tighten security, right out of the box. Customers retain high levels of protection unless they choose to lower their guard.

**Secure In Deployment.** Microsoft now provides a variety of services to help customers take some simple steps to maintain and improve the security of software they already use. Windows Update, for instance, can automatically send alerts and download security patches and tools as they become available. Other update services are tailored to the needs of organizations large and small.

**Secure Through Communications.** We are listening carefully to the concerns of customers and the technology community.

## ***Computing can become more secure through coordinated efforts and continued vigilance***

Based on their feedback, we intensified our efforts to provide clear, timely security bulletins and other guidance to consumers as well as technology professionals. And in January, we expanded access to Windows source code with a new program for sharing code and related technical data with national governments and international organizations, specifically to help them meet their security needs.

Because cyber-criminals will always seek ways around any safeguards, Microsoft will continue working to make its software more secure, and individual vigilance will remain essential. That means everyone should stay up to date on patches, use a personal firewall, run antivirus software and keep it up to date.

To help keep intruders at bay, we all must do our part.

*One in a series of essays on technology and society. More information is available at [microsoft.com/issues](http://microsoft.com/issues).*

**Microsoft®**

© 2003 Microsoft Corporation

# A Better Way to Protect Endangered Species

Laura E. Huggins is  
a research fellow at  
the Hoover Institution.

**T**he fate of many endangered species is in the hands of private property owners. By maintaining habitat for rare species, landholders are providing a public service, and the best way to encourage landholders to protect these species is to ensure that they are compensated rather than penalized for this service.

The Endangered Species Act (ESA), passed by Congress and signed by President Nixon in 1973, established lists of endangered and threatened species and prohibited the killing or harming of them and their habitat.

**Measured by any reasonable standard, the ESA has failed.** In the past three decades many more species have been added to the list than have been removed. Even if we count all of the species removed from the list as “successes,” they account for only 3.5 percent of the species recorded since 1973. According to the General Accounting Office, most species are closer to extinction now than when they were originally listed.

The first step toward reforming the ESA should be to moderate the damage that the current act inflicts on private landowners. Nearly 80 percent of listed species depend on private land for all or part of their habitat requirements. Yet if landholders provide suitable habitat for an endangered species, they run the risk of their property being subject to severe government regulations, many of which constrain land from being used profitably. An unintended consequence of the ESA is that it effectively creates perverse incentives for landowners to destroy species and their habitat—the “shoot, shovel, and shut up” syndrome.

Some environmental leaders recognize the problem. Michael Bean, an Environmental Defense Fund attorney who is often credited with authorship

of the ESA, acknowledged that there is “increasing evidence that at least some private landowners are actively managing their land so as to avoid potential endangered species problems.” He emphasized that these actions are “not the result of malice toward the environment” but “fairly rational decisions, motivated by a desire to avoid potentially significant economic constraints.”

Cases of preemptive habitat destruction have become notorious. For instance, as the golden-cheeked warbler was about to be added to the endangered species list, a firm that owned hundreds of acres of warbler habitat hired workers to chainsaw the entire stand of oak and juniper trees, thus preserving its investment by eliminating the birds’ habitat.

**For wildlife conservation to be successful, negative restrictions on landowners must be replaced with positive incentives,** such as those in Texas’s Landowner Incentive Program. Under the tenets of this state-initiated program, landholders voluntarily enter into a contract to perform measurable actions (such as restoring native vegetation or performing controlled burns) with the Texas Parks and Wildlife Department. Biologists are allowed on the property to monitor progress, and landowners are paid on the basis of meeting the contract’s objectives. Grants of up to \$10,000 are available to property owners who actively manage their land for rare species.

As Aldo Leopold explained nearly seventy years ago, “conservation will ultimately boil down to rewarding the private landowner who conserves the public interest.” For more on the importance of protecting private property rights, see *Property Rights: A Practical Guide to Freedom and Prosperity* (Hoover Press 2003).

— Laura E. Huggins

Paid for by the Hoover Institution, Stanford University.



## Interested in more commentary on public policy?

Visit us on-line at [www.hoover.org](http://www.hoover.org) or contact us to receive a complimentary copy of the 200-page, award-winning Hoover Digest.

## Hoover Institution...ideas defining a free society

STANFORD UNIVERSITY, Stanford California 94305-6010  
Toll-free: 877.466.8374 Fax: 650.723.1687  
[info@hoover.stanford.edu](mailto:info@hoover.stanford.edu) [www.hoover.org](http://www.hoover.org)



# STAY ALERT! BE INFORMED!



## Listen To World News & Events As They Unfold!

World news is too important to ignore – and too important to wait for. Get immediate world news, straight from the source. No need to wait for updated internet reports and news at the hour when there are hundreds of correspondents reporting directly to you, live from around the globe. That is the power of Shortwave Radio.

The eTraveller VII is the latest in shortwave technology from Grundig. With its smooth sleek design, this palm-sized radio is your headquarters for information at your command. Listen to broadcasts out of Europe, Africa, and the Middle East, as well as local AM and FM stations.

Features include an informative LCD, 30 available memory positions, sleep timer and alarm, plus dual conversion circuitry for optimal sensitivity and selectivity. Whether you're an experienced shortwave listener or a newcomer to the world of international broadcasts, this is the radio for you. For more information, visit [www.grundigradio.com](http://www.grundigradio.com).

Size: 3 1/2" x 5 1/2" x 1 1/2"



**GRUNDIG**  
*Keeps You Informed!*

**To Order, Call Us Toll-Free: 1-800-793-6542 Ext. W510 Visit our website: [www.grundigradio.com](http://www.grundigradio.com)**

24 hours a day, 7 days a week. We accept Visa, MasterCard, American Express, Discover, Check or Money Order. The Grundig eTraveller VII AM/FM/Shortwave Radio is now \$199.95 (plus \$10 shipping and handling and tax, if applicable). Please allow 3-4 weeks for shipment. If paying by check/money order, please include name, address, daytime phone number, product, quantity and Ext. code from this ad (e.g. W510). We can not ship to a P.O. Box. Please ask us about our 30-day guarantee.

**Ston/Grundig Direct, 1015 Corporation Way, Palo Alto, CA 94303**

\*CA orders add 9.25% sales tax (billed with shipment). Payment in US\$. AK, HI, PR & International orders (including Canada) please fax: 1-650-903-3867 for shipping and handling. All dollar and fees for international orders are the responsibility of recipients. Please allow 3-4 weeks for shipment. If paying by check/money order, please include name, address, daytime phone number, product, quantity and Ext. code from this ad (e.g. W510). We can not ship to a P.O. Box. Please ask us about our 30-day guarantee.

# Contents

February 10, 2003 • Volume 8, Number 21

- 2 Scrapbook . . . . . *Dumb celebrities, Miller time, and more.*      6 Correspondence . . . . . *Frist's Nashville, TIA, and Roe.*  
4 Casual . . . . . *Irwin M. Stelzer, ex-expatriate.*      7 Editorial . . . . . *Morality in Foreign Policy*

## Articles

- 8 Bush Zeroes In *Ignore the domestic head fakes. He's focused like a laser on Iraq.* . . . . . BY FRED BARNES  
10 Daschle Loses It *The Senate minority leader's responsibility gap.* . . . . . BY STEPHEN F. HAYES  
15 Liberalism vs. Diversity *The high stakes in the Supreme Court's affirmative action decision.* . . . . . BY STANLEY KURTZ  
17 How Not to Abolish Affirmative Action *The dangers of a court-delivered victory.* . . . . . BY CHARLES KRAUTHAMMER  
19 Ariel Sharon, Victorious Centrist *Who woulda thunk it?* . . . . . BY JOHN PODHORETZ



Cover photo: Getty Images

## Features

### 21 The End of Appeasement

*Bush's opportunity to redeem America's past failures in the Middle East.* . . . . . BY MAX BOOT

### 29 Inside a Crisis Pregnancy Center

*Lessons learned about bad fathers, young mothers, despair, and hope.* . . . . . BY EVE TUSHNET

## Books & Arts

- 33 While Clinton Slept *How Osama and Saddam got away with it.* . . . . . BY REUEL MARC GERECHT  
38 History as Bigotry *Daniel Goldhagen slanders the Catholic Church.* . . . . . BY DAVID G. DALIN  
41 Prince of the City *Rudy Giuliani explains how he did it.* . . . . . BY FRED SIEGEL  
43 THE STANDARD READER . . . . . *What's in THE WEEKLY STANDARD aisle of your local bookstore.*  
44 Parody . . . . . *The Paris years of Patrique Le Buchanan.*

William Kristol, Editor      Fred Barnes, Executive Editor

David Tell, Opinion Editor      David Brooks, Christopher Caldwell, Senior Editors      Richard Starr, Claudia Winkler, Managing Editors

J. Bottum, Books & Arts Editor      Matt Labash, Senior Writer      Stephen F. Hayes, Staff Writer

Victorino Matus, David Skinner, Assistant Managing Editors      Lee Bockhorn, Associate Editor      Jonathan V. Last, Online Editor

Beth Henary, Katherine Mangu-Ward, Editorial Assistants

Lev Nisnevitch, Art Director

Max Boot, Tucker Carlson, John J. DiIulio Jr., Noemie Emery, Joseph Epstein, Andrew Ferguson, David Frum, David Gelernter, Reuel Marc Gerecht, Brit Hume, Robert Kagan, Charles Krauthammer, Tod Lindberg, P.J. O'Rourke, John Podhoretz, Irwin M. Stelzer, Contributing Editors

Terry Eastland, Publisher      David H. Bass, Deputy Publisher

Nicholas H.B. Swezey, Advertising & Marketing Manager      John L. Mackall, Advertising Sales Manager      Lauren Trotta Husted, Circulation Director

Carolyn Wimmer, Executive Assistant      Tina Winston, Finance Director      Catherine Titus, Publicity Director

Taybor Cook, Rachel DiCarlo, Staff Assistants

the weekly  
Standard

THE WEEKLY STANDARD (ISSN 1083-3013) is published weekly (except the first week in January, the second week in July, the third week in August, and the first week in September) by News America Incorporated, 1211 Avenue of the Americas, New York, NY 10036. Periodicals postage paid at New York, NY, and additional mailing offices. Postmaster: Send address changes to THE WEEKLY STANDARD, P.O. Box 96127, Washington, DC 20077-7767. For subscription customer service in the United States, call 1-800-274-7293. For new subscription orders, please call 1-800-283-2014. Subscribers: Please send new subscription orders to THE WEEKLY STANDARD, P.O. Box 96153, Washington, DC 20090-6153; changes of address to THE WEEKLY STANDARD, P.O. Box 96127, Washington, DC 20077-7767. Please include your latest magazine mailing label. Allow 3 to 5 weeks for arrival of first copy and address changes. Yearly subscriptions, \$78.00. Canadian/foreign orders require additional postage and must be paid in full prior to commencement of service. Canadian/foreign subscribers may call 1-850-682-7653 for subscription inquiries. Visa/MasterCard payment accepted. Cover price, \$3.95. Back issues, \$3.95 (includes postage and handling). Send manuscripts and letters to the editor to THE WEEKLY STANDARD, 1150 17th Street, N.W., Suite 505, Washington, DC 20036-4617. Unsolicited manuscripts must be accompanied by a stamped, self-addressed envelope. For a copy of THE WEEKLY STANDARD Privacy Policy, visit [www.weeklystandard.com](http://www.weeklystandard.com) or write to Customer Service, THE WEEKLY STANDARD, 1150 17th St., N.W., Suite 505, Washington, D.C. 20036. THE WEEKLY STANDARD Advertising Sales Office in Washington, DC, is 1-202-293-4900. Advertising Production: Call John L. Mackall 1-202-496-3354. Copyright 2003, News America Incorporated. All rights reserved. No material in THE WEEKLY STANDARD may be reprinted without permission of the copyright owner. THE WEEKLY STANDARD is a trademark of News America Incorporated.



[www.weeklystandard.com](http://www.weeklystandard.com)

# With War Protests Like These . . .

All this talk of war is so . . . so . . . oppressively grown-up and serious. Therefore, we say: Thank God for America's valiant army of really dumb celebrity-intellectuals, without whom there'd be almost nothing to smile about. Take actress Janeane Garofalo, for instance. She's fronting the latest anti-anti-Saddam TV "info"-mercial sponsored by a group called Win Without War (its first was that redux "daisy ad" aired during the Super Bowl, in which viewers were clued in on the little secret that President Bush's Iraq policy will lead inevitably to a global thermonuclear conflagration).

In the latest installment, Ms. Garofalo asks viewers to consider whether the United States has a right to pick on poor old Iraq, "a country that's done nothing to us." And then Bishop Melvin G. Talbert, chief ecumenical officer of the United Methodist Church, appears with the answer: No, he says, attacking such a country "violates God's law and the teachings of Jesus Christ." (It may come as a shock to the bien-pensant European fellow travelers of the Garofalo-Talbert axis to learn that it is their side of the debate that is claiming to channel Jesus Christ, and not the cowboy president they despise.)

Here in Washington, connoisseurs of such inanity are particularly abuzz about Ms. Garofalo's January 27 interview with the *Washington Post*, in which she complains that her own prominence in the antiwar movement represents some kind of weird plot by The Man.

"They have actors on so they can marginalize the movement," Garofalo explains. "It's much easier to toss it off as some bizarre, unintelligent special-interest group." Ms. Garofalo is neither unintelligent nor uninformed, she wants us to know: "Now that I'm sober, I watch a lot of news." ♦

## Miller Time

Happily, not all of Hollywood has lost its marbles. If you were lucky, you caught comedian Dennis Miller on the *Tonight Show* with Jay Leno last week, when he went off on liberals, Saddam Hussein, and even the ACLU (and not for the first time, as this page has noted before).

Miller admitted he is a Bush fan and that he loved the president's State of the Union speech. With regard to the inspectors in Iraq, Miller asked, "How long do we have to wait for these morons?" He compared Hans Blix to Inspector Clouseau—and pictured the U.N. teams "driving around in the Scooby-Doo van" looking for weapons. "The only 'smoking gun' I need to see is the one they use to kill Saddam Hussein."

Miller then went further, joking that the only way to get pacifist Sean Penn on board is by convincing him that Saddam Hussein is a member of the paparazzi. As for the French, he said it's no surprise that one of their enduring

phrases is "au contraire." "The only way the French are going in is if we tell them we found truffles in Iraq. . . . The French are always reticent to surrender to the wishes of their friends and always more than willing to surrender to the wishes of their enemies."

The jokes didn't stop here. Miller said he's pro-school vouchers (which received a large round of applause) and pro-dodgeball. As for the American Civil Liberties Union, well, we'll let him explain it in his own words:

"The ACLU spent this entire holiday season protesting public displays of the nativity scene. Yeah, that's the problem with America right now: Public displays of Christ's birth, that's the problem. It's unbelievable to me. The ACLU will no longer fight for your right to put up a nativity scene, but they'll fight for the right of the local freak who wants to stumble onto the scene and have sex with one of the sheep." (Thanks, as always, to our friends at the Media Research Center for providing some of the transcripts.) ♦

## U.N. Believable

Here's something to look forward to: From May 12 until July 19, Iraq will assume the presidency of the U.N.'s Conference on Disarmament. The rotation of the presidency is alphabetical and in the spring session will actually be split between Iran and Iraq.

This is just the latest in a series of such embarrassments. Syrian foreign minister Farouk Shara arrived in New York last summer just in time to head up the U.N. Security Council. While in the chair, he defended Palestinian terrorist attacks and submitted a report from his country to the Security Council saying that the 1998 Arab Convention for the Suppression of Terrorism "distinguishes between terrorism and legitimate struggle against foreign occupation." Syria was one of the 10 countries elected to a two-year council seat, and held the presidency for a month.

But not all of the U.N.'s problems can be blamed on the alphabet or random rotations. As Charles Krautham-





mer noted in his *Washington Post* column last week, “Libya was elected [to the chairmanship of the U.N. Commission on Human Rights], by deliberate vote, by overwhelming vote—33 to 3. The seven commission members from the European Union, ever reliable in their cynicism, abstained. They will now welcome a one-party police state—which specializes in abduction, assassination, torture and detention without trial—to the chair of the United Nations’ highest body charged with defending human rights.”

Trying to put the best face possible on the Iran-Iraq disarmament ascen-

dancy, U.N. spokesman Farhan Haq said, in essence, it’s no big deal because the group has no agenda. He said that since the conference is “not exactly a body that has been meeting to deal with issues substantively for several years, the main worry is not about a procedural issue such as who is the chair; it’s about what it can do.”

Here’s a better talking point: By the time May 12 rolls around, perhaps the presidency of the U.N. Conference on Disarmament will be entrusted to the capable hands of a diplomat representing a democratic, disarmed Iraq. Wouldn’t that be fitting? ♦

## Berlusconi’s Moment

The most moving political speech last week was arguably not the State of the Union but the answer given by Italian prime minister Silvio Berlusconi to a reporter’s question at the White House on Thursday: “We will never forget that we owe our freedom—our freedom—our wealth to the United States of America. And our democracy. And we also will never forget there have been many American young lives that were lost and sacrifice themselves for us.

“So for us, the United States is not only our friend, but they are the guarantee of our democracy and our freedom. And I already has the opportunity to say this to President Bush. Every time I see the U.S. flag, I don’t see the flag only representative of a country, but I see it as a symbol of democracy and of freedom.” ♦

## Play Ball

Among the unsung benefits of finally having a Republican governor in Maryland: It increases the odds of Major League baseball’s returning to the nation’s capital. The leading foe of the idea is Peter “Asbestos” Angelos, the trial lawyer and Democratic campaign mega-donor who fears the competition would damage the profitability of his own (badly mismanaged) franchise, the Baltimore Orioles. But Maryland officialdom no longer lines up behind him.

At a *Washington Post* luncheon last month, the new governor, Bob Ehrlich, endorsed a D.C. franchise, saying, “There are five million people between Washington and Baltimore; the area can support two teams. This [Washington, the Maryland suburbs, and Northern Virginia] region deserves a team.”

A partisan blow, yes. But one all baseball fans not named Angelos should applaud. ♦

## HOMeward BOUND

When your eyes tear up at the singing of “God Bless America” during the broadcast of the Super Bowl on your favorite British television station, it’s time to go home. That’s what my wife, Cita, and I decided. London is a wonderful place, but it has suddenly become more foreign, more hostile, at times drowning us in a rising tide of anti-Americanism. Prime Minister Tony Blair may be a stalwart supporter of America; he may say over and over that Britain and America share common values; he may emphasize the powerful influence that Britain has on American policy. But his is now a lonely voice.

Start with a group you might think would be on our—America’s—side: expatriate American citizens. Not all are quite as, er, unversed as one who at a dinner party told me she resented being called “expatriot” when she visits America. When I explained that she had misunderstood the word, she shed 30 years of resentment at being tagged with what she considered an unpleasant label.

Not that expatriot is entirely inapt, either in my dinner companion’s case or in that of many other Americans who have chosen to live permanently in Britain. Like most expatriates we meet, she finds George W. Bush an embarrassment, and feels forced to forestall any guilt-by-association by making her contempt for the president clear to all auditors.

The expat litany goes something like this. Bush wasn’t “really” elected, but was appointed by a rabidly right-wing Supreme Court; don’t blame me, I voted for Gore. Bush’s sentences are a horror, not the sort we were taught to use at the (mostly) posh Eastern schools we attended, and not at all as

well formed as those of our heroes, Adlai Stevenson, Jack Kennedy (he and Jackie never, ever embarrassed us when they visited Europe), and even Bill Clinton, whose drawl is simply charming.

The president’s positions on gun control and abortion certainly don’t reflect those of any Americans we know, and his flag-waving should have gone out of style with Teddy Roosevelt. Most of all,

please don’t associate us with his unilateralism: We favor the Kyoto accord, think that only the U.N. has the moral authority to disarm Iraq by force, and wish the Bushies would treat our European allies, France and Germany, with more deference.

And that’s just the *Americans* resident in Britain. The native political class is worse. The Labour left views America as an evil force; its parliamentary members shuttle to Baghdad to pay court to Saddam Hussein. They believe the *New York Times*, the *Washington Post*, and the rest of the media are Bush’s poodles, and that’s how he can get away with his saber-rattling and oppression of the domestic poor.

The followers of Labour’s lefty politicians at least have a degree of courage not present in their elected representatives. They have boarded buses for a leisurely, fun-filled tour of Europe, en route to Iraq, where they

plan to deploy themselves as human shields to protect the military installations that will be the targets of the Anglo-American coalition when it loses patience with the U.N.’s foot-dragging.

Nor can an American in London take much comfort from the political right. To its members, America is the debaser of Britain’s culture. Why, Britain’s television audiences seem to prefer *The West Wing* and *The Simpsons* to the latest BBC documentary on the fate of Scotland’s hedgehogs.

Worse still, Americans are not visiting Britain in the same numbers as in the past, in part because they are too cowardly to travel when a war in the Middle East looms. So harrumph some old-line Tories, who recall their ancestors’ courage in the Sudan from their easy chairs at their clubs. It seems that the absence of these American philistines is sharply reducing audiences for Shakespeare plays, the ballet, and the opera, threatening the finances of these arts groups. A contradiction? No matter: Once you have decided that American rednecks subsist on reality television and Texas barbecues, and shun Britain’s elevating but breathtakingly boring television, facts become the enemy of truth, to resurrect a slogan of the old left.

Let me not leave you with an unbelievably gloomy picture. The prime minister, at great damage to his political standing, will be with us in Iraq because—cynics, take note—“it is the right thing to do.” Cab drivers, shop clerks, construction workers, and others who don’t hobnob with the chattering classes are pro-American almost to a man and a woman. They love Florida in the winter, New York any time of year, understand that the U.N. is useless, and that Saddam must go. And they treat us Americans as the cousins we are. And then there is all that Shakespeare, ballet, opera, and music. Dr. Johnson had it right, “When a man is tired of London, he is tired of life.” But when a couple is tired of anti-Americanism, it’s best to get out of London. At least for a while.

IRWIN M. STELZER





# CON GAME

## “Conservative” Flim-Flam

**President Bush** has laid out his agenda. Call it bold, brilliant, audacious or outrageous. But don't call it “conservative.”

That's what he and his party call it, of course, but it's a sad parody of real conservative values – fiscal prudence, accountability, limited government. It's shaped more by what GOP donors want than by any loyalty to those values or what the nation really needs.

**Fiscal prudence?** It's profoundly immoral to finance tax breaks for today's wealthiest Americans by **borrowing money from the unborn**. But that's the GOP plan.

**Accountability?** Bush wants us to spend hundreds of billions on missile defense, but **he's exempted the Star Wars program from all normal oversight and accountability**.

**Limited government?** Bush's Total Information Awareness program will let the Pentagon electronically monitor our personal lives. He's appointing judges who will allow **government to control women's reproductive health**.

**Real conservatives know what “investment” means.** But today's “conservatives” push an energy policy that promotes more oil and gas production – just what their political patrons want. They ignore research that shows how **a dollar invested in energy efficiency or renewable energy creates more jobs than the same dollar invested in fossil fuels**. And they're gutting policies that cost little but save us a lot – like the Clean Air Act. Between 1970 and 1990, clean-air improvements produced \$23 trillion in health benefits for the nation, according to the American Lung Association. That return dwarfs the cost to industry of compliance, and we're richer and healthier for it.

**Where are the REAL conservatives today? The president and his party are running a con game. They want us to think they're conservative, but they're not.**

**They're poseurs stealing from the future, and there's nothing conservative about that.**

**TomPaine.com** common sense



**A Public Interest Journal**

# Correspondence

## NASHVILLE NOTE

I JUST FINISHED “Bill Frist’s New South” by David Brooks (Jan. 27). Well done! I grew up in Belle Meade a few years ahead of Bill Frist, went to Peabody Demonstration School (one of the big three along with Battle Ground Academy and Frist’s Montgomery Bell Academy), and then Vanderbilt. My father was a lawyer, and my mother was involved in local charities, including the Swan Ball. Brooks’s article captures what it was like to grow up in that environment.

I would pick very few nits. But I found one truly outrageous error: West Nashvillians don’t support Cadillac dealers. The Mercedes has been the vehicle of choice in West Nashville since the mid-60s.

Here’s a point he missed about the diversity of Tennessee. When I tell folks where I’m from they ask, “Where’s your accent?” I speak with a general Midwestern-type accent. And I tell people, “This is the way Nashvillians speak.”

Howard Baker’s East Tennessee twang is very different from what you’ll hear in Memphis. And my relatively plain Midwestern is typical of Nashvillians born since WWII. A great place and a great article.

WILLIAM JOHN JOSEPH HOGE  
Westminster, MD

## TWEAKING TIA

HEATHER MAC DONALD’S “Total Misrepresentation” (Jan. 27) in support of the proposed Total Information Awareness program seems persuasive enough, but she glosses too breezily over what has so correctly inflamed the suspicion of the media and general public. As long as the Bush administration commits such public relations disasters as the appointments of John Poindexter and Henry Kissinger to inappropriate positions, it will continue to undermine its credibility. The mere appearance of impropriety disqualifies.

Clinton did something similarly inane when his very first chore as president was an in-your-face attempt to reform U.S. military policy on gays.


If politicians are crafty enough to grab

power, why then do they so often go after their own feet with a shotgun?

JAMES JOHNSON  
Plattsburgh, NY

HEATHER MAC DONALD is correct when she demonstrates that most of what was said about the Total Information Awareness program in the media is overblown hype. But one question about it still bugs me: Why in the world is the Defense Department doing the development work?

Under the 1878 Posse Comitatus Act, DoD has absolutely no domestic law enforcement function except in very limited and special circumstances (e.g., the National Guard). If TIA was a project of the Justice Department or Homeland



Security, fine. These departments and their sub-organizations are trained to operate within constitutional and legal boundaries. DoD plays with a looser set of rules (e.g., the military justice system, fewer constraints on interrogations and imprisonments, and even allowing summary executions in extreme cases). They have no organizational conception of respecting the constitutional rights of U.S. citizens; they are not supposed to.

I agree TIA is a good idea. But unless this watchdog has a strong legal leash and an experienced handler (DoJ or Homeland Security), I don’t think Congress could, or should, let it out.

JON ZIMMER  
Fairborn, OH

## ROE 30 YEARS LATER

THANK YOU FOR David Tell’s review of four recent books about abortion (“Planned Un-Parenthood,” Jan. 27). He notes that in Gloria Feldt’s *Behind Every Choice Is a Story*, “almost without fail, her correspondents make impressive, valiant efforts to express convincing pride in their decisions to abort.”

A very different picture emerges in the new *Forbidden Grief: The Unspoken Pain of Abortion*, by Theresa Burke with David Reardon.

In *Forbidden Grief*, Burke shares stories about women who feel shamed, guilty, abandoned, traumatized, and wounded by their abortions. These stories are the result of Burke’s direct clinical experience with the Center for Post-Abortion Healing, which she opened in Philadelphia in 1986, and with Rachel’s Vineyard ([www.rachelsvineyard.org](http://www.rachelsvineyard.org)), a weekend retreat program for healing after abortion.

Apart from anecdotal evidence, in the last 18 months, statisticians have published five studies—in the *British Medical Journal*, the *Southern Medical Journal*, the *American Journal of Obstetrics and Gynecology*, the *American Journal of Orthopsychiatry*, and the *Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry*—that show a strong correlation between abortion and later distress, including heightened rates of suicide, psychiatric hospitalizations, mental health treatment, parenting difficulties, and substance abuse. Readers may consult [www.afterabortion.org](http://www.afterabortion.org) for details.

Tell notes that in Feldt’s book, as her correspondents speak proudly of their abortions, “few among them manage to pull it off completely; an undercurrent of profound uncertainty bubbles to the surface.”

I’m a volunteer counselor with Rachel’s Vineyard. On our weekends, we have the privilege of witnessing the action of transforming grace in the hearts of brave and honest men and women who no longer feel any uncertainty about what happened in their abortion(s). Theirs is the nearly unknown story of 30 years in the culture of death.

LESLIE GRAVES  
Madison, WI

# Morality in Foreign Policy

At the Republican National Convention in 1976, as Ronald Reagan's challenge to Gerald Ford for the GOP presidential nomination was on the verge of falling short, the Reagan forces assembled for one last battle. They rallied behind a challenge to Ford's secretary of state, Henry Kissinger, and his "realistic" foreign policy of détente. They succeeded in substituting their own foreign policy plank for the administration's preferred one in the Republican platform. The Reagan plank was entitled "Morality in Foreign Policy."

In 1976, George W. Bush was, one assumes, like his father, a Ford supporter. Dick Cheney, Don Rumsfeld, and Paul Wolfowitz were serving in the Ford administration, and Cheney, as White House chief of staff, was directing the effort to stave off Reagan. Condoleezza Rice was in graduate school, doing work on the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe that would later win the approbation of Kissinger's deputy, Brent Scowcroft.

Now all of them are Reaganites. What happened?

Well, Reagan won—first the presidency, then reelection, then the Cold War. In America, results matter. As President Bush said in his State of the Union address, "America's purpose is more than to follow a process—it is to achieve a result." The result the president had in mind was "the end of terrible threats to the civilized world." Reagan ended one such threat, with the collapse of the Soviet Union.

Now, as the president explained, we face a different kind of threat—"a world of chaos and constant alarm," where "outlaw regimes" sponsor terrorism and acquire and trade in horrific weapons, the better to threaten their neighbors and intimidate their people. The nature of the regime is crucial, rather than some alleged underlying, geographical or economically or culturally determined "national interest." The priority of the political order implies a morally informed American foreign policy. Thus, a brutal tyranny like Saddam's is evil, Bush said, or else "evil has no meaning"—and Bush intends to liberate the people of Iraq from their regime. As President Bush said to the people of Iraq, "Your enemy is not surrounding your country—your enemy is ruling your country."

Now, it is true that regimes don't exist apart from the various material interests and geographical and historical characteristics of nations. So "morality in foreign policy" is always limited. Necessity has its claims. And the freedom and security of one's own nation come first. But our freedom and security turn out to be inextricably linked to the character of regimes elsewhere in the world.

It mattered that the Soviet Union was an "evil empire." It matters that North Korea has, as the president said, an "oppressive regime rul[ing] a people living in fear and starvation." Perhaps the only misstep in the foreign policy part of his State of the Union address was the president's statement that "the North Korean regime will find respect in the world, and revival for its people, only when it turns away from its nuclear ambitions." In truth, the regime of Kim Jong Il cannot and should not "find respect in the world." Of course, it may be prudent for now to try "to show the North Korean government" that its nuclear program is a mistake. But in the end, Americans look forward to the day when this regime is as much a thing of the past as that of Nicolai Ceaucescu or Joseph Stalin.

Temporary accommodations will always be with us, as long as we live in a world of nations, and regimes. President Bush has no hopes for world government, or for a world beyond conflict. He embraces "morality in foreign policy," but does not entertain illusions of "the end of foreign policy."

Bush does invoke a sort of "American exceptionalism." But his understanding of our mission is not narrowly American. "The liberty we prize," he said, "is not America's gift to the world, it is God's gift to humanity." Americans must be held to the same "high standard for humanity" as every other nation.

It is an admirable vision—one that's moral and strategic and practical. Now all the president has to do is execute it successfully—in Iraq, and beyond. For, to repeat, "America's purpose is more than to follow a process—it is to achieve a result." A vision can inspire and guide. But there is no substitute for victory.

—William Kristol



# Bush Zeroes In

Ignore the domestic head fakes. He's focused like a laser on Iraq. **BY FRED BARNES**

**W**HY THE HEAD FAKE by the White House? Why the chatter from aides suggesting Iraq would not be the focus of President Bush's State of the Union address? Why the insistence that reporters would be asking about matters other than Iraq the day after the president's speech? My guess is there's worry Bush might suffer the fate of his father, losing reelection because voters feel he's indifferent to fixing a weak economy. That, plus fear Bush is seen as not merely alarmed about Iraq and its weapons of mass destruction (WMD) but downright obsessed with uprooting Saddam Hussein.

No need to worry. One of Bush's favorite words is "prioritize," and that's what he's doing quite properly on Iraq. After the September 11 terrorist attacks and the victory in Afghanistan, Iraq became the next logical step in the war on terrorism. Bush believes September 11 revealed Saddam now has a delivery vehicle to reach the United States with his WMDs—not intercontinental missiles but al Qaeda terrorists who've proven their ability to slip into the United States. This threat is imminent and must be granted a higher priority than cutting taxes and reforming Medicare, important as those initiatives are. The truth, of course, is that Bush can handle all three at once, though Iraq takes more of his time, and should.

Iraq colors his view of foreign leaders. Bush is far from forgiving German chancellor Gerhard Schröder and French president Jacques Chirac for abandoning him on Iraq. He talks to many European leaders on the

phone these days, but not Schröder or Chirac. He feels Schröder personally betrayed him by exploiting anti-Americanism in his reelection campaign last year. And he faults Chirac for joining Schröder in opposition to Bush on Iraq for domestic political and commercial reasons—and for not



*The front page that amused the president*

informing Bush before announcing he was jumping ship. According to a senior administration official, Bush believes that once Iraq is liberated Schröder and Chirac and their countrymen will regret "in their soul" that they didn't take part in "freeing people from repression." Bush, by the way, loved the *New York Post's* front-page picture of the two with the headline: "AXIS OF WEASEL." Three days later, a copy of the *Post* was still on a desk in his secretary's office next to the Oval Office.

Bush's new favorites are prime ministers Jose Maria Aznar of Spain and Silvio Berlusconi of Italy. They were behind the letter signed by eight European leaders and sent to the *Wall*

*Street Journal* and European newspapers backing the United States on Iraq. (Three other nations later asked to sign.) When Berlusconi visited the White House last week, Bush referred to him, without irony, as "my friend Silvio." They traded bouquets. America, Berlusconi said, is "the best friend of my country." Bush responded, "Your English is very good." "No, no," the prime minister said. "I have never the time . . . to learn better English."

More important, Berlusconi sounded like Bush with an Italian accent in spelling out the danger posed by Iraq. "We really fear that after the series of terrorist attacks, which culminated with the attacks of September 11, there is the intention of the terrorists to really come to a terrible disaster," he told reporters at a photo opportunity. "And to do so, they have to avail themselves of the biological, chemical weapons that we know were available to Saddam Hussein."

As best one can tell, Bush has internalized the case against Saddam. He is appalled at the murderous nature of Saddam's dictatorship and frustrated that some other leaders aren't as horrified. When the president met over lunch with TV news anchors on the day of the State of the Union speech, he said Saddam has "tortured, maimed and killed people." In the speech, he said Saddam has left "thousands of his own citizens dead, blind, or disfigured." The senior official characterized Bush's view this way: "The thought of people living under the barbaric hand of this guy . . . there doesn't seem to be much concern about the Iraqi people," particularly by Schröder and Chirac.

The next day Bush's closest ally, British prime minister Tony Blair, visited Bush at Camp David. Despite strong dissent in his own Labour party, Blair is following Winston Churchill's advice never to let the English get separated from the Americans. He echoed Berlusconi. There are "two key issues that face our world today," terrorism and WMDs, he said. "We should realize those two

*Fred Barnes is executive editor of THE WEEKLY STANDARD.*

# How to Listen to and Understand Great Music

**AT LAST...** 48 brilliant recorded lectures that let you comprehend and enjoy great music more fully than ever before!



Arnold Schönberg



Claude Debussy



Giuseppe Verdi



Wolfgang Amadeus Mozart



Johann Sebastian Bach



Ludwig van Beethoven



Richard Wagner



Hector Berlioz

Bach: Planet Art. Debussy and Wagner: Music Division, Library of Congress. All other images: Prints and Photographs Division, Library of Congress.

**H**ave you ever listened to a favorite piece of music and wanted to know more about it? Have you wondered what it would be like to truly *hear* music in the way the composer intended? Have you ever felt confused by musical forms, wondering what exactly distinguishes a symphony from a concerto, a minuet from a rondo?

Then you owe it to yourself to try **How to Listen to and Understand Great Music**, a 48-lecture course taught by Professor Robert Greenberg of San Francisco Performances.

His engaging and informative lectures will soon have you hearing and enjoying music not just with your ears, but with your *mind*!

## A Very Special Offer

And now, for a limited time, you can get all 48 lectures for a special price of just \$179.95 on DVD, \$139.95 on videotape, \$129.95 on compact disc, or \$94.95 on audio tape, a savings of up to \$520 off list!

This offer is being made to introduce you to The Teaching Company, the renowned educational enterprise which records America's best college teachers for its Great Courses series.

You can learn at home, on the highway, or even while you exercise, revisiting the subjects you loved best at school or taking on new ones.

With Dr. Greenberg's help, you'll come to understand the social, political, religious, and aesthetic dynamics that made up the world of Europe's great composers, and what those composers had to say about it—much as literature students study Shakespeare's England to more fully understand his works. In effect, then, the music itself becomes a “universal, non-verbal language” opening a unique window on the world in which the composers actually lived.

Dr. Greenberg presupposes no special knowledge, and provides a solid introduction to basic musical terms and elements.

He demonstrates each musical point either with his own piano rendition or with digitally recorded excerpts. Also, he conveys his vast knowledge not only with puckish wit and contagious passion, but in *plain English*.

Come walk with the giants of music history. Come hear and understand great music with a depth of understanding and enjoyment you never thought possible before and do it all with no risk—Your *complete satisfaction* is guaranteed.

A vast canvas of 10 centuries of Western concert music... illuminated in 48 witty and engaging lectures.

- Part I:** The Ancient World Through the Early Baroque (*Lectures 1-8*)
- Part II:** The High Baroque (*Lectures 9-16*)
- Part III:** The Classical Era I (*Lectures 17-24*)
- Part IV:** The Classical Era II and the Age of Revolution—Beethoven (*Lectures 25-32*)
- Part V:** Nineteenth-Century Romanticism (*Lectures 33-40*)
- Part VI:** From Romanticism to Modernism—1848 to 1913 (*Lectures 41-48*)

“Bob Greenberg's presentations on music are brilliant performances. The content, delivery and style combine the highest scholarship with ingenious metaphors and perfectly timed, and often irreverent, humor that results in an illuminating and thoroughly enjoyable experience for everyone from the expert.”

—RUTH FELT,  
FOUNDER AND DIRECTOR,  
SAN FRANCISCO PERFORMANCES

**SAVE UP TO \$520!**  
**OFFER GOOD UNTIL MARCH 5, 2003**

**NO-RISK MONEY-BACK GUARANTEE!**

To order, mail coupon below or call our toll-free number: (Please refer to **Priority Code 13721**)  
**1-800-TEACH-12 (1-800-832-2412) Fax: 703-378-3819**

## About Your Professor:

**ROBERT GREENBERG** (Ph.D., UC-Berkeley) is a popular lecturer whose work has been reported in the *Wall Street Journal* and other media outlets. He is the creator of the San Francisco Symphony's “Discovery Series.” He has won three Nicola de Lorenzo Composition Prizes and three Meet-The-Composer Grants. He speaks frequently to both lay and academic audiences across North America and Europe, and is an award-winning composer with more than 45 works to his credit.

Shop securely on-line at:  
**www.teach12.com/ws**



### THE TEACHING COMPANY®

4151 Lafayette Center Drive, Suite 100  
Chantilly, VA 20151-1232  
[www.teach12.com/ws](http://www.teach12.com/ws)

#### Priority Code 13721

Please send me **How to Listen to and Understand Great Music**, which consists of 48 forty-five minute lectures, with complete lecture outlines.

- ☐ **DVD \$179.95** (reg. price \$699.95) **SAVE \$520!** plus \$25 shipping, handling, and guarantee.
- ☐ **Video \$139.95** (reg. price \$549.95) **SAVE \$410!** plus \$20 shipping, handling, and guarantee.
- ☐ **Audio CD \$129.95** (reg. price \$499.95) **SAVE \$370!** plus \$20 shipping, handling, and guarantee.
- ☐ **Audio \$94.95** (reg. price \$349.95) **SAVE \$255!** plus \$15 shipping, handling, and guarantee.
- ☐ **Check or Money Order enclosed**

\*Additional international shipping charges may apply.  
\*\*Virginia residents please add 4.5% sales tax.

☐ Charge my:



ACCOUNT NUMBER

EXP. DATE

SIGNATURE

NAME (PLEASE PRINT)

MAILING ADDRESS

CITY/STATE/ZIP

PHONE (If we have questions regarding your order)

☐ **FREE CATALOG.** Please send me a free copy of your current catalog (no purchase necessary).

Offer Good Through: **March 5, 2003**

threats are not different, they're linked." Bush said of his friend Blair, "I trust his judgment and his wisdom."

What's striking is how different Bush's concerns are from his father's during and after the war in 1991 against Saddam. Bush senior left Saddam in power and Iraq intact, all in the name of stability, and exited quickly. He is a foreign policy realist. But Bush junior is an idealist who wants to spread democracy and freedom and make sure other hostile countries rid themselves of WMDs or don't acquire them in the first place. Stability is not his overriding concern. For Bush, "this is an ongoing war," an aide says. And he believes that there's a unique opportunity now to turn nations into democracies. It's become a cliché to say Bush is more like Ronald Reagan politically and ideologically than his father. However, in his vision of a new world where democracy is triumphant with major U.S. help, Bush is an updated version of Woodrow Wilson.

His passion about Iraq and democracy was evident in his delivery of the State of the Union. The first part of the speech dragged, but when he got to terrorism and Iraq he spoke with more drama and emotion. "It's what animates him," an aide says. "It's on his heart, his mind, his agenda. This is what he wants to talk about."

Bush likens the past two months, when popular support for regime change in Iraq was drifting downward—and his job performance rating was declining—to the period in the late summer of 2002 leading up to his September 12 speech at the United Nations. It led to a stronger resolution on Iraq than expected and to new inspections. "There was great angst," the senior official says. The prestige press was against intervention in Iraq and treated Bush as "way off base." But with the president's U.N. address, "clarity came to the situation." Bush thinks it's coming again, which is one reason why, in his prioritizing, Iraq stays at the top of the list. Any White House head fakes to the contrary should be ignored. ♦

# Daschle Loses It

The Senate minority leader's responsibility gap.

BY STEPHEN F. HAYES

MUCH OF THE WORLD focused last week on Saddam Hussein's continuing failure to comply with U.N. demands for disarmament, and on President Bush's State of the Union address Tuesday. Senate Minority Leader Tom Daschle had a different agenda. He spent the week undermining the president by questioning his honesty.

Last Monday, chief U.N. weapons inspector Hans Blix addressed the Security Council. He detailed the many examples of Iraq's refusal to comply with U.N. Resolution 1441. The same day, Daschle spoke to a roomful of journalists at the National Press Club. He delivered a stinging indictment of the Bush administration, charging, among many other things, that President Bush has been misleading the American people. The result, he said, is a "credibility gap" between the wartime leader and those he is responsible for protecting.

Daschle is primarily concerned that President Bush has not proven that Saddam Hussein presents, in Daschle's words, "a very imminent threat." That's a high bar. It seems less a realistic request of the Bush administration than a deliberately unattainable standard of evidence. For, as Daschle surely knows, if President Bush had proof that the Iraqi threat were imminent, to say nothing of "very imminent," the president wouldn't waste time publishing the evidence. He would eliminate the threat.

Daschle's posturing makes the top Senate Democrat look less like a concerned statesman than a determined political opponent. And already, polls show a chasm between Republicans

and Democrats on national security issues. A survey released last week by James Carville's Democracy Corps found that respondents trust Republicans over Democrats to keep Americans safe by 47 percent to 16 percent. Some of Daschle's fellow Democrats are nervous.

"I like Tom and he's in a tough position here," says fellow Democrat Evan Bayh, senator from Indiana. "The base of the Democratic party is in profound disagreement with the rest of the country on this issue. And I guess for Tom not to recognize that would be political suicide."

Still, Bayh rejects Daschle's argument. "I don't understand those who want to wait until the threat is imminent," Bayh says. "Do we wait until the missiles are launched, until the smallpox is in the country? The consequences of error could be catastrophic."

If hawkish Democrats are worried by Daschle's approach to policy, they are likely to be dismayed by his more personal attacks. As *Washington Post* congressional reporter Jim VandeHei wrote Thursday, "In recent days, Daschle has accused the president of essentially lying to the American people."

In an appearance on CBS's *Face the Nation* on January 26, Daschle was asked eight questions about Iraq. Three times he stated that the "burden of proof" is on the Bush administration. This despite 12 years of Iraqi noncompliance and 17 U.N. resolutions requiring Saddam to prove that he has disarmed.

Daschle was more specific in his talk at the press club. "If we have proof of nuclear and biological weapons, why don't we show that proof to the world, as President Kennedy did 40 years ago when he

*Stephen F. Hayes is a staff writer at THE WEEKLY STANDARD.*



# PLEASE SELECT FROM THESE IMPORTANT BOOKS They May Change Your Life



Probably this year's most important self-improvement book...

**"How You Too Can Develop a Razor-Sharp Mind..."**

**Only \$29.95\***

**by Gerardo Joffe**

(\*But see below for an even better deal!)

It is scientifically proven: Your brain is like a muscle. Sit in front of the tube, preferably with a six-pack and a bag of potato chips and it will turn flabby and quite useless. Exercise it vigorously and you will indeed be able to develop a razor-sharp mind and a steel-trap memory. There may even be a bonus of better sex and longer life. And, finally, a rigorously exercised brain will not develop Alzheimer's disease. This breakthrough book (soft cover, 460 pages, 8-1/2" x 11" format) will be your trainer and monitor to your new well-developed brain. (A \$30 Haverhill gift certificate is bound into the book. So it's practically FREE. What a deal!)

Sid Tuchman of Indianapolis, IN says: "What an astonishing book! One can almost hear those brain cells crackle!" Hugh Cunningham, DDS, of Albany, GA says: "This is marvelous! I already feel a whole lot smarter than before I immersed myself in Joffe's 16-Level Paradigm." And Lloyd Harmonett of Winnfield, LA says: "If this book will not make you smarter, nothing will."



The most important book about salesmanship ever written...

**Selling is Simple...**

**Only \$19.95\***

**by Karl Bach**

(\*But see below for an even better deal!)

Karl Bach was a penniless and uneducated German-Jewish immigrant. He spoke very little English and, to top it off, he had a physical impediment. Not being able to get any other job, he enlisted as a Fuller Brush salesman. Within two months, he became the most productive salesman Fuller had ever had. From a standing start he had developed irresistible sales techniques. He applied those methods and insights to the life insurance business. Within three years, he became one of the most successful life insurance producers in the US. He founded and became principal owner of the San Francisco Life Insurance Company, which eventually merged with the Philadelphia Life Insurance Company. He became a very, very wealthy man. In this book, Karl reveals his enormously successful salesmanship methods.

If you are in any area of selling, you should be able to at least quadruple your performance by reading this groundbreaking book and following its precepts. There is no reason why you shouldn't be as successful as Karl Bach -- you have so much more going for yourself than he did. You owe it to yourself to buy this book. You and your family will be glad you did.



This course may lead you to a great future...

**Get Rich in Mail Order (a 7-volume course)**

**Just \$19.95\***

**Volume 1**

(\*But see below for an even better deal!)

Gerardo Joffe is president emeritus of Haverhill. He founded it in 1967. It's one of the oldest and most successful mail-order companies in the United States. He is an engineer and a Harvard MBA. In his 7-volume work, *How to Build a Great Fortune in Mail Order*, he gives a complete course on how to get started in this fascinating business, how to prosper in it and how to build a great fortune in it.

Volume 1 (207 pages) covers the following important topics: Lesson 1 - *What the Mail-Order Business is All About*; Lesson 2 - *How to Get Started in the Mail-Order Business*; Lesson 3 - *How to Organize Your Mail-Order Business*; Lesson 4 - *Some Fast Thoughts About Mail-Order Merchandise*. There are also two important appendices: A - *Components and Structure of a Mail-Order Offer*; B - *Your Chances for Success in the Mail-Order Business*. There is also an "expanded" version. It costs \$39.95 and includes a Workbook with all of the exhibits and a 3-Cassette Audio Tape Set for studying at leisure while you drive. It is highly recommended. This is a continuity. Unless cancelled, you will get subsequent volumes at approximately six-week intervals. Even if you do not plan to go into the mail-order business, you will benefit greatly by the insights and revelations of this course. The course covers merchandising, advertising, marketing, customer service, retail store operations, financial and ratio analysis, syndication, data processing, and much more. The course is a virtual college education. Please, only credit card orders for this item.

PLEASE GIVE ORDER CODE Y441

**\*Our "special deal": BUY ANY 2 BOOKS AND GET ANOTHER ONE FREE!**

For instance: Buy a \$29.95 book and a \$19.95 book and get another \$19.95 book FREE!

FOR FASTEST SERVICE, ORDER BY  
TOLL-FREE PHONE OR BY FAX  
SEE NUMBERS BELOW

For customer service, please call (415)  
356-7801. For wholesale orders, call  
Chris Simpson at that same number.

You may order by toll-free phone, by mail  
or by fax and pay by check or  
Visa/MasterCard. Credit Card orders only,  
please, for "Get Rich in Mail Order". Add  
shipping/insurance of \$4.95 for one book or  
\$9.90 for two or more books, plus sales tax  
for CA delivery. You have 30-day return. We  
do not refund shipping charges.

Code: Y459

**advance books**

division of Jomira/Advances  
478 Third St., #211, San Francisco, CA 94107

Order by toll-free phone: (800) 600-2777 or (fastest!) by fax: (415) 356-7804

Visit our website at [www.jomira-books.com](http://www.jomira-books.com)



sent Adlai Stevenson to the United Nations to show the world U.S. photographs of offensive missiles in Cuba?" And in a floor speech two days later, Daschle discussed the Iraqi threat not in terms of the weapons of mass destruction that Saddam Hussein has, but of those he "could acquire."

Yet Daschle's own record on the matter of using force in Iraq reveals him to be a hypocrite. And the tortured logic he employs to question the main premise of the Bush administration's Iraq policy—that Saddam Hussein possesses weapons of mass destruction—exposes him as a political opportunist.

First, the history. Five years ago, on February 17, 1998, with troops massing in the Persian Gulf, President Clinton went to the Pentagon to prepare the nation for the likelihood of war. Clinton's speech was important enough to warrant a *CBS News Special Report*. Dan Rather, not the soaps, greeted viewers who tuned in on their lunch hour. "War is a very strong word, but something akin to war is definitely planned," reported Rather. "Our men and women are in position, if given the command to strike by the president of the United States, and the president is going to talk about his reasons for considering putting those men and women in even greater danger."

Clinton gave a strong speech. "Just consider some of the facts," he said.

Iraq repeatedly made false declarations about the weapons that it had left in its possession after the Gulf War. When UNSCOM would then uncover evidence that gave the lie to those declarations, Iraq would simply amend the reports. For example, Iraq revised its nuclear declarations four times within just 14 months and it has submitted six different biological warfare declarations, each of which has been rejected by UNSCOM. In 1995, Hussein Kamal, Saddam's son-in-law, and chief organizer of Iraq's weapons-of-mass-destruction program, defected to Jordan. He revealed that Iraq was continuing

to conceal weapons and missiles and the capacity to build many more. Then and only then did Iraq admit to developing numbers of weapons in significant quantities and weapon stocks. Previously, it had vehemently denied the very thing it just simply admitted once Saddam Hussein's son-in-law



Tom Daschle

defected to Jordan and told the truth.

Daschle, for one, was convinced. Actually, he was convinced even before President Clinton "made the case" on February 17. Six days earlier, as the U.S.-Iraq standoff intensified, a reporter had asked about a suggestion from Saddam Hussein that members of Congress fly to Baghdad to negotiate. "Senator Daschle, is there any sentiment in the Senate to take up

Saddam's invitation to go over and have a chat?"

Daschle: "Well, I don't know. You know, you can send congressmen or cruise missiles, I suppose. But I—well, the cruise missiles are the smart weapons. No, I don't mean that. No, I don't think that that's in our interest. We've had many efforts. If he wants to sit down and negotiate, we will do so. But he has to agree that there will be compliance with international law and the agreements that he signed in 1991. Period."

The bottom line? "There's no reason to talk unless he's willing to acknowledge and commit to that realization. Short of that, there's no purpose in more talk."

*There's no purpose in more talk.*

That belief might explain what


Daschle did next. Not content merely to offer rhetorical backing to President Clinton, Daschle tried to rally his fellow Democrats to support the use of force. He reiterated the administration's argument. "Look, we have exhausted virtually our diplomatic effort to get the Iraqis to comply with their own agreements and with international law. Given that, what other option is there but to force them to do so? That's what they're saying. This is the key question. And the answer is, we don't have another option. We have got to force them to comply, and we are doing so militarily."

Daschle didn't insist that the Clinton administration obtain congressional approval. Neither did he require the president to go to the U.N. In fact, the Clinton administration's position, as articulated by National Security Adviser Sandy Berger, was that both steps were unnecessary. Tom Daschle said nothing in protest. Similarly, Daschle never demanded evidence proving Saddam to be a "very imminent threat," and he never called for "proof to the world" that Saddam had weapons of mass destruction. He now insists on both from the Bush administration.

I asked Daschle last Wednesday what accounted for his change of position. "At that time, of course, Presi-

Thomas Fluharty

# Catholics: You Want Blood & Guts? You Got It!



Recently, a man wrote in to a Catholic magazine complaining, "Why can't you be more blood and guts like the *New Oxford Review*?" Dealing with the horrendous sex crisis in the Church certainly calls for blood and guts.

Priestly sex scandals in the U.S. Catholic Church were few and far between before seminaries began accepting homosexuals in the 1960s. The homosexual population of the U.S. is estimated at between 2 and 10%. Homosexuals in the priesthood are now estimated to be between 30 and 60%. A major study conducted by *The Kansas City Star* found that "priests are dying of AIDS at a rate at least four times that of the general U.S. population...."

Is celibacy the culprit? No. *The Times of London* found that priests in the (Anglican) Church of England are dying of AIDS at a rate roughly 2 to 3 times greater than Catholic priests in the U.S.! Note well: The Church of England has *always* allowed priests to marry.

Not surprisingly, 90 to 98% of the publicized cases of priestly pedophilia committed by U.S. Catholic priests involve *boys* (whether prepubescent or postpubescent). Not all "gays" are pedophiles, but pedophilia — called "intergenerational love" by homosexuals — is part and parcel of the homosexual subculture, which places great emphasis on youthful physique and is notoriously promiscuous, and whose publications commonly carry themes of adult-child sex.

How did a number of seminaries get flooded with homosexuals? Not only because many bishops and religious orders have allowed seminaries to admit ho-

mosexuals — in direct violation of Vatican policy — but because certain vocations directors and seminaries reject a candidate, not because he's homosexual but because he's "homophobic" — they also reject candidates deemed "rigid" (a code word for orthodox).

In certain seminaries, professors openly dissent from Catholic teaching on homosexuality, and homosexual behavior is protected. And those orthodox, morally straight seminarians who managed to get in under the radar and who object to the scandalous goings-on are persecuted or forced out. Meanwhile, sodomites are ordained priests, and they protect and promote one another, forming what is widely known as "the Lavender Mafia," extending even into episcopal ranks.

Thanks to the media, the U.S. bishops have finally had to take a strong stand against "sexual abuse of minors." But the get-tough policy affects only some priestly violations of the sacred vow of celibacy. It doesn't affect sex with men and other priests. As long as sodomite priests are often winked at, and certain seminaries continue to be hothouses for flamers and promote the dissent that justifies immorality, sexual license in the priesthood will continue. But it *must and will be stopped*, if not by the bishops then by us the laity.

We at the *NEW OXFORD REVIEW*, an orthodox Catholic monthly magazine run by laymen, don't sweep scandal under the rug. We deal with it, and with all the issues of concern to loyal Catholics. Subscribe! Together we'll help restore the Church's lost credibility.

(Please allow 2 to 8 weeks for delivery of first issue.)

## SPECIAL DISCOUNT RATES FOR FIRST-TIME SUBSCRIBERS

- ☐ One-year subscription ..... \$14 (regularly \$19)
- ☐ One-year student, unemployed, or retired person's subscription ..... \$12 (regularly \$16)
- ☐ Two-year subscription ..... \$23 (regularly \$35)

- ☐ One-year non-U.S. subscription ..... US\$24 (regularly \$29) Payment must be drawn in U.S. Dollars.
- ☐ Sample copy ..... \$3.50

→ Our prices are so low because you can't pay by credit card and payment must accompany order. Send letter or this coupon with check payable to **NEW OXFORD REVIEW**. Mail to:

**NEW OXFORD REVIEW**  
Room 546  
1069 Kains Ave.  
Berkeley CA 94706

Name (Please print or type) \_\_\_\_\_

Street Address or P.O. Box \_\_\_\_\_

City \_\_\_\_\_

State \_\_\_\_\_

Zip \_\_\_\_\_



dent Clinton enjoyed broad-based international support,” he said. “It is essential for us to consult with the international community now.”

Even if this were true, it hardly explains the vast differences between Tom Daschle in 1998 and Tom Daschle in 2003. And it’s not true.

Then, as now, France, Russia, and China opposed doing anything about Iraqi intransigence. And then, as now, several allies supported our efforts. Most of the countries supporting President Clinton in 1998 support President Bush today—the notable exceptions being Germany and Canada. Another major difference is found in the support from Gulf countries. In 1998, we had Kuwait. Today, we are likely to have Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, Oman, and Saudi Arabia. The Bush administration also seems to have won the support of Jordan, a nation that didn’t support Clinton in 1998 and even remained neutral in the 1991 Gulf War.

But before I could point that out, Daschle had reverted to his talking points on burdens of proof and imminent threats. Once again, he called for evidence of Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction. The more he talked, the more obvious it became that he is challenging not only the Bush administration’s strategy for dealing with Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction, but also its claim that Iraq possesses such weapons.

When U.N. weapons inspectors left Iraq in 1998, Saddam Hussein still had not accounted for vast stocks of chemical and biological weapons produced in the 1980s and 1990s. They were also absent from Iraq’s “full, final and complete” declaration of its weapons submitted to the U.N. Security Council in early December 2002. Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz catalogued the omissions in a recent speech at the Council on Foreign Relations.

There are also gaps in accounting for such deadly items as 1.5 tons of the nerve gas VX, 550 mustard

filled artillery shells, and 400 biological weapons-capable aerial bombs that the U.N. Special Commission concluded in 1999 Iraq had failed to account for. There is no mention of Iraqi efforts to procure uranium from abroad. Iraq’s declaration fails to account for its manufacture of missile fuel for ballistic missiles Iraq claims it does not have. Nor is there information on 13 recent Iraqi missile tests cited by Dr. Blix that exceeded the 150-kilometer limit. Iraq has not verifiably accounted for, at a minimum, two tons of anthrax growth media. There is no explanation of the connection between Iraq’s extensive unmanned aerial vehicle programs and chemical or biological agent dispersal. There is no information about Iraq’s mobile biological weapon production facilities.

By suggesting that Saddam may not currently possess weapons of mass destruction, Daschle implicitly accepts a series of bizarre assumptions: (1) that Saddam Hussein unilaterally disarmed at some point between 1998 and 2002, the four-year gap between U.N. inspections on Iraqi soil, (2) that he disarmed despite his refusal to do so for the seven years inspectors were in Iraq (1991-1998), and (3) that he somehow failed to notify the international community of this disarmament—a heads-up that would have ended the U.N. sanctions that have strangled the Iraqi economy. No serious person believes this. Does Tom Daschle? I put the question to him directly.

“You don’t think Saddam disarmed unilaterally, do you?”

“We don’t have any concrete evidence that he has not,” Daschle replied. “And that’s the issue.”

That assertion places Daschle on the farthest antiwar fringe of his party, for it raises the possibility that Saddam Hussein is telling the truth and George W. Bush is lying. It may also explain why Daschle seems to be taking cues from the likes of Rep. Jim McDermott, one of three “Baghdad Democrats” who traveled to Iraq last fall to criticize the Bush administration. The similarities are striking.

In October, McDermott appeared from Baghdad on ABC’s *This Week* with George Stephanopoulos. He was asked about a rather outrageous claim he made before he left, that “the president of the United States will lie to the American people in order to get us into this war.” McDermott didn’t back down: “I believe that sometimes they give out misinformation. . . . It would not surprise me if they came out with some information that is not provable, and they, they shift it. First they said it was al Qaeda, then they said it was weapons of mass destruction. Now they’re going back and saying it’s al Qaeda again.”

Here’s Daschle from his recent appearance at the National Press Club: “The White House has given many reasons: because Saddam is a threat to his neighbors, because he gassed the Kurds, because he tried to kill the first President Bush, because he’s making weapons of mass destruction, because, they say, he was involved in September 11. When they give so many rotating reasons it makes people wonder which one is the real one, or if the real reason is none of the above.”

Leave aside the point that the White House has been careful not to claim there is evidence linking Saddam to September 11. Why shouldn’t the president give more than one justification for his policy? The issue isn’t how many arguments there are but whether they are sound.

One that Daschle himself was buying as recently as four months ago was Saddam’s record in the area of weapons of mass destruction. As Daschle said on the floor of the Senate on October 10, 2002: “We know that Iraq maintains stockpiles of some of the world’s deadliest chemical weapons including VX, sarin, and mustard gas. We know that Iraq is developing deadlier ways to deliver these horrible weapons, including unmanned drones and long-range ballistic missiles. And we know Saddam Hussein is committed to one day possessing nuclear weapons.”

What was that about a credibility gap? ♦

# Liberalism vs. Diversity

The high stakes in the Supreme Court's affirmative action decision. **BY STANLEY KURTZ**

**R**EGARDLESS OF HOW the Supreme Court rules this summer on affirmative action at the University of Michigan, its decision is bound to bring change to our racial spoils system. Because affirmative action is an intrinsically unstable practice, the awaited ruling, far from settling the issue, will only touch off yet another round of debate and reform in a continuing battle.

The cause of the battle is the obstinate fact that racial preferences are at odds with liberal principles. As a result, they generate irresolvable conflicts within liberal institutions. The early experiments in affirmative action were thought of as temporary suspensions of proper meritocratic procedure. But no one wants to think of himself as a temporary exception to the right way of doing things. So the advocates and beneficiaries of affirmative action have elaborated a series of postmodern, post-liberal justifications for racial preferences, which have opened the way for preferential thinking in nearly every aspect of political and social life.

The outcome has been a struggle between those who seek to expand affirmative action and those who seek to eliminate preferences. Already four states have banned affirmative action in public institutions. In the rest of the country, racial preferences have been taken far beyond the mere "plus factor" they were restricted to by the famous *Bakke* decision of 1978. And everywhere, an ideology of "multicultural diversity" competes with classic liberalism to define our social contract.

So far, the debate over the Michigan case has focused on what will happen if the Court prohibits racial preferences. Will colleges "re-segregate"? Will our streets and campuses be clogged with protesters? None of the scare scenarios will come to pass. Yet in the rush to envision a world without preferences, the real story has been overlooked: What will happen if the Court upholds racial preferences is actually far more dangerous.

Today, no one really knows whether diversity is a legitimate justification for affirmative action. It was Justice Lewis Powell's tie-breaking opinion in *Bakke* that first advanced diversity as a rationale for racial preferences. Since no other justice joined Powell's opinion, the legal standing of diversity is unclear. That points to a hidden problem. If the Supreme Court now unambiguously affirms diversity as a justification for affirmative action, its decision will do far more than simply freeze existing preferences in place. It will unleash diversity as never before.

Once diversity has acquired unchallenged legal standing, advocates of affirmative action will inevitably seek to extend its range. If diversity can justify racial preferences in university admissions, why not in the selection of jurors? What about preference programs for federal policymakers or even legislators? (Quota systems for female legislators have already been floated in Canada, Europe, and India.) Should there be preferences for females in the high school chess club, or for males on the cheerleading squad? Pro-androgyny feminists have already called for preference programs for male employees at day-care centers. And won't Muslim immigrants soon be coming

into their own as a victimized minority entitled to preferences?

Once the principle of diversity has been affirmed, there are no necessary limits, and every demand for inclusion can be adjudicated. Republicans might even get into the act, with suits to force political diversity onto colleges and universities dominated by Democrats. The prospect of lawsuits to impose political diversity suggests what a mess we'll be in once the Supreme Court grants clear legal standing to a doctrine of group rights. Such a doctrine cannot help but operate in opposition to the principles of liberal individualism.

Once it accords constitutional standing to diversity, the Court will provoke a kind of slow motion crisis, in which even the structure of our government, not to mention principles like one-man-one-vote and equal protection under law, will be subject to fundamental renegotiation.

**S**o much for the aftermath of a Michigan victory. But suppose the Court prohibits the use of racial preferences in college admissions. What will really happen then?

Better to begin with what will not happen. If the Supreme Court outlaws racial preferences in higher education, there will be no social unrest—no urban riots or torched college campuses. In the states that have abolished affirmative action in public higher education, no social upheaval ensued. Affirmative action was ended by court order in the relatively conservative state of Texas, and by the governor in Florida, but liberal California and Washington did the deed by referendum. They could do so because Americans everywhere oppose preferences. From the beginning, the practice was imposed by judicial and administrative fiat. The public will not rebel at the abolition of something it never wanted in the first place.

Academic affirmative action, then, is not the stuff of revolutions. Racial preferences come into play only at relatively selective institutions—at most, 20 percent of all colleges and universities. And an even smaller slice will feel

*Stanley Kurtz is a research fellow at the Hoover Institution.*

the effect of national repeal, since many schools in states without affirmative action have adopted race-neutral ways of increasing minority enrollment.

Even black Americans seem likely to accommodate themselves to the banning of preferences. The truth is, nearly all fairly worded polls show that between one-third and two-thirds of African Americans (along with lopsided majorities of all Americans) reject affirmative action. *National Journal* columnist Stuart Taylor Jr. concluded as much from a careful survey, earlier this month, of polling on affirmative action in higher education. For example, the *Washington Post*/Kaiser Family Foundation/Harvard University racial attitudes survey in the spring of 2001 found that only 12 percent of African Americans agreed that “race or ethnicity should be a factor” in college admissions, hiring, and promotion, while 86 percent of African Americans agreed that such decisions “should be based strictly on merit and qualifications other than race/ethnicity.” The upshot of Taylor’s survey is that the black community is at best divided on the question of academic affirmative action and on balance arguably opposed. No doubt a Supreme Court decision against preferences would precipitate protests on some campuses. Yet even at a relatively radical school like Berkeley, opponents of affirmative action lack broad student support, and have been unable to mount mass demonstrations since California abolished racial preferences.

But if ending racial preferences in higher education won’t kick off a revolution, what it will do is spur measures designed to restore minority enrollment to something like its current levels. Those measures will fall into three broad categories—outreach, percentage plans, and thinly veiled defiance—and will occasion the new battles in our long-running war over preferences.

Before academic affirmative action was turned into a quota system, it was meant to be outreach. The idea was to identify promising minority students

in high school (or earlier), and help them gain the skills and experience needed for admission to college. The most welcome result of an end to racial preferences would be a return to genuine outreach. In fact, it was only the abolition of affirmative action by Proposition 209 that forced the University of California system to create the Berkeley Pledge, an outreach program designed to help low-income students with no family history of higher education qualify for college the right way—without preferences. And some of the less glamorous campuses in the University of California system, like U.C. Riverside, have been particularly successful, since Prop. 209, at operating sound outreach plans.

*The worst effect of a decision against Michigan will be to drive racial preferences underground, where they are hard to remedy.*

The percentage plans adopted in Texas, California, and Florida present a more problematic alternative to affirmative action. By guaranteeing a place at a state school to students who graduate in, say, the top 8 percent of their high school class, percentage plans restore a significant minority presence to colleges, and do so on a race-blind basis. Because of percentage plans, every public college in California and Texas now has an enrollment of underrepresented minorities that exceeds 10 percent. That’s important, because the University of Michigan claims that 10 percent is the level of minority representation required to create a “critical mass” of diversity on campus.

So percentage plans effectively ward off the scare scenarios purveyed by the advocates of affirmative action. And, in addition to being race-blind, percentage plans have another advantage: They reward hard work by students at the weakest high schools.

Nevertheless, percentage plans still contravene the principle of merit in university admissions. They allow a student with poor test scores and modest grades at an uncompetitive school to jump ahead of a hard-working student with high test scores and decent grades at a competitive school. And percentage plans are motivated, in great part, by a desire to engineer racial balance. All of which may provide grounds for legal challenges in the future. But perhaps the most important thing about percentage plans may be that they are instituted—and can be modified—democratically. Thus, percentage plans offer the Supreme Court an opportunity to shift at least a portion of the debate over academic admissions from courts to legislatures, where the results will be determined by the public, instead of imposed from on high.

The wrinkle is that percentage plans work only for state systems, and only in places where a substantial minority population attends schools that are racially relatively homogeneous. But the real constituency for affirmative action is made up of left-leaning faculty members and administrators at America’s elite colleges and universities. These people are in a panic because most elite colleges draw on a national pool of students, and therefore cannot use percentage plans. Over and above outreach programs, these schools are almost certain to adopt a posture of barely concealed defiance to any Court-ordered end to affirmative action.

Almost as though it were putting out an advertisement for such defiance, the *New York Times* ran a front-page story in December on the techniques used by admissions officers at Rice University in Texas to circumvent a court-imposed ban on racial preferences. According to the *Times*, Rice was afraid of “openly” defying the ban, and so resorted to “creative, even sly ways” to meet its minority enrollment goals, while still pretending to be race-blind. The Rice admissions committee, for example, circumvents the ban on asking an applicant’s race by encouraging students to dis-

cuss their “cultural traditions” in admissions essays. Then the committee singles out and discusses minority applicants, using a kind of informal code.

At some point after the elimination of affirmative action, suits will no doubt be brought against elite private colleges for their refusal to abide by the ban on preferences. Unfortunately, it will be a lot tougher to get the goods on clandestine discrimination like that at Rice than it was to expose the de facto quota system at a large public university like Michigan. One look at Michigan’s numerically weighted—and publicly available—admissions criteria, and the quota fairly leaps off the page. Unless you’re a sympathetic reporter from the *New York Times*, good luck getting the dirt on a small private college’s “creative” and “sly” strategies for restoring preferential discrimination. So the worst effect of a decision against Michigan will be to drive racial preferences underground, where they are less accessible to legal remedy or democratic debate.

Despite these difficulties, the contours of a post-affirmative action world are both knowable and livable. With luck, public opinion will favor high quality outreach programs and relatively modest percentage plans. Legal challenges will follow. But at least the principles of race-blindness and individual rights will control the terms of the debate. In the event of a Michigan victory, by contrast, the controlling principle will be an ever-expanding doctrine of diversity.

The Supreme Court, then, finds itself facing a choice not between simple abolition of affirmative action and mere confirmation of the status quo. What the Court will really do this summer is create a framework for the next phase of our cultural and political struggle over the meaning—and even the legitimacy—of liberal democracy.

We stand at a fork in the road. On the one hand, the Court can set aside the diversity rationale, thereby affirming classic liberalism and initiating a series of arguments over the practical application of race-blind principles. On the other hand, the Court can

sanction the doctrine of diversity, and thus well and truly open Pandora’s Box. Once diversity has acquired unquestioned legal sanction, we will be forced to confront what, to some

degree, is already playing out: a creeping constitutional civil war—a battle for the soul, and even the existence, of liberalism—whose outcome is impossible to foresee. ♦

# How *Not* to Abolish Affirmative Action

The dangers of a victory delivered by the Supreme Court. **BY CHARLES KRAUTHAMMER**

**B**EWARE WHAT you wish for. Conservatives have long hoped for the abolition of affirmative action on the grounds that racial preferences of any kind are not only destructive of the American ideal of equality but devalue minority achievement and poison ethnic relations. And the day now seems at hand, the issue having once again reached the Supreme Court. The University of Michigan cases now before the Court grant explicit racial preferences to black, Hispanic, and Native American students. The practice is deeply offensive to any notion of equality. Michigan’s undergraduate school adds 20 points to the application of any student belonging to these designated minorities (a perfect SAT score, by way of comparison, is worth only 12 points)—the mathematical equivalent of toting up everyone’s score and then *subtracting* 20 points if your skin happens to be white, or if you happen to be, say, Asian or Arab American.

The question of the day had been whether the president would cave in to the post-Trent Lott reaction and abandon his long-standing opposition to racial preferences by ducking the case. He did not. However, many conservatives (including at this magazine) were disappointed that he did not oppose the whole scheme root and

branch by denying that diversity is a compelling state interest. He merely argued that there are other, race-neutral ways to achieve diversity, thus obviating the need and the constitutional justification of race-sensitive programs like Michigan’s. The president’s brief would thus strike down the Michigan program but leave the issue of abolition unresolved.

The question conservatives have not squarely faced, however, is whether we really want to win the argument at its sharpest and most comprehensive—the total abolition of affirmative action—in the Supreme Court. I used to think so. I’m no longer sure that is the way we should want this issue resolved.

I never thought I’d find myself talking about the wisdom of the *Bakke* decision. Not the logic, mind you. The logic was an abomination. The Court ruled every-which-way, inventing unintelligible distinctions between quotas and goals and timetables and the mere consideration of race as a “plus factor.” In effect, it simply took a dodge, leaving the door open for every jurisdiction and organization to work out its own affirmative action schemes. Yet in retrospect there was a social benefit to this messiness. That cacophonous ruling created a marketplace of affirmative action schemes. *Bakke* did not foreclose the issue. It tried to contain but not abolish the allocation of preferences. As a result, it allowed society a

*Charles Krauthammer is a contributing editor to THE WEEKLY STANDARD.*



quarter of a century to duly experiment and see the results.

As social science, the experiment has been a success. Affirmative action has been tried and found wanting. When put to the test of popular opinion, racial preferences fail. Affirmative action is dying a popular and legislative death. It would be overkill and perhaps even counterproductive to preempt that success by killing it judicially by fiat of the Supreme Court.

The flaws and injustices of affirmative action as demonstrated by its real-life practice over the past quarter-century have become so apparent that even California and Washington, two of the most liberal states in the union, decisively abolished it. In California, a state that went Democratic in the last two presidential elections by about 12 percentage points, a 1996 ballot measure to abolish all racial preferences passed with a 54 percent majority. This in a state that is now minority white.

Equally liberal Washington state abolished affirmative action two years later by a 16-point landslide, despite the fact that affirmative action opponents had been vastly outspent. In Florida, the governor (Jeb Bush) preempted a similar referendum by legislating the abolition of race preferences in college admissions and in contracting. True, the referendum movement has slowed down in the face of establishment and institutional pressure. But it has not been reversed. Affirmative action is about where abortion was 30 years ago. As societal norms are changing, it is on its way out.

It is an accident of history that the Michigan case came to a head within days of the 30th anniversary of *Roe v. Wade*. Nonetheless *Roe* should be a caution to us. At the time the decision was handed down, the laws against abortion were also on their way out. Legislatures were beginning to loosen or abolish the restrictions. Public opinion was changing. But instead of letting the people decide, the Court stepped in and legalized abortion by fiat.

The United States is the only country in the Western world to have settled the abortion issue not by popular or democratic action but by judicial decree. The result has been a social disaster. Even the more sophisticated liberals acknowledge the harm. "*Roe v. Wade* . . . seemed entirely to remove the ball from the legislators' court," said Ruth Bader Ginsburg in her Madison Lecture at NYU Law School (March 9, 1993). It thus "halted a political process that was moving in a reform direction and thereby, I believe, prolonged divisiveness and deferred stable settlement of the issue." The result of that hubris was to leave abortion opponents unreconciled, disenfranchised, and angry—which is why the abortion issue remains neuralgic and unsettled 30 years later.

We are at the same stage today on affirmative action. Public opinion and the democratic process, if allowed to operate, are on their way to abolishing this singular violation of the American ideal of equality. We're winning. It is perhaps better not to win it all too soon, too fast in the Supreme Court, by taking the issue off the table of public opinion and out of the democratic process. It might be best for the Court to follow the middle position advanced by the Bush administration, which would strike down Michigan's system but leave to the people the more general question of diversity and the use of preferences to achieve it. I trust the people.

Now, of course, there is a fundamental difference of *rightness* between the Supreme Court's ruling on *Roe* and its potential ruling on the Michigan cases. The constitutional right to an abortion is a pure invention, a fiction conjured out of a "penumbra, formed by emanations" of the Constitution. In other words, out of whole cloth. On the other hand, any Court ruling against racial preferences clearly would be grounded in the plainest meaning of the Equal Protection Clause and of the founding ideas of the republic.

My point is not the justice or rightness of any such ruling. My point is

its political and social effect. There are many issues of principle at stake here, and one of them is the wisdom of the Supreme Court's decreeing social revolutions. Conservatives generally think that is a terrible idea. And they are right.

The one exception is, of course, *Brown v. Board of Education*. But it is not a justification for judicial social crusades. *Brown* was right but *Brown* was entirely *sui generis*. Its uprooting of social norms and precedents should never have been taken as a model because *Brown* was unique—not because of the moral force of unshackling a subject people, but because of the constitutional imperative to undo disenfranchisement. Generally speaking, popular and legislative will should determine the great questions of the age. However, when the question is the disenfranchisement of one section of the citizenry, you have a Catch-22. The disenfranchised cannot express their popular will and initiate change until they have been enfranchised—but they cannot be enfranchised until that change has already taken place. Blacks were denied the very power to abolish their political disabilities by the fact of their political disabilities. Which is why the courts had to intervene.

But these conditions simply do not apply in other situations. They certainly do not apply to abortion, where women have a vote (although the fetus does not, but that's another question). And they certainly don't apply to racial preferences, a question that can be settled by expressions of popular will, since no one, majority or minority, is denied the right to influence that decision.

There seems to me no question that a radical abolition of racial preferences by Supreme Court decree would be both just and constitutional. But I suspect it would be something of a Pyrrhic victory. This is a battle better won at the ballot box and in the legislatures. Win it in the courts—foreclose the issue by judicial action—and it will end up in the streets. Like abortion. ♦

# Ariel Sharon, Victorious Centrist

Who woulda thunk it?

BY JOHN PODHORETZ

*Jerusalem*  
**T**HERE'S A SONG that's sung around the bonfire at every Jewish summer camp called *Hinei Ma Tov*. Its lyrics are taken from Psalm 133: "Behold how good and how pleasant it is for brethren to dwell in unity."

Maybe Jews love the song so much because they know so little unity in reality. Anti-Semites think Jews form a monolithic conspiracy. As if. In the Israeli elections last week, voters had to choose from 16 parties. In a country with 4.7 million eligible voters, those parties slice the ideological and demographic pie astonishingly thin. There are several parties for *haredim*, the ultra-religious Jews known colloquially in English as "black hats." There are Arab Israeli parties. Two parties rose out of the emigration from the Soviet Union in the early 1990s. The once-cohesive Israeli Left has fractured into four parties.

While you could call the political debate refreshingly combative and freewheeling, that's just a polite way of saying slanderous. One member of a *haredi* party declared that Tommy Lapid, the head of the aggressively secular party Shinui, "wants to turn us all into ash." This would be repulsively rough if it were said about anybody; considering that Lapid is a Holocaust survivor, it was beyond imagining. But the rhetorical broadsides

exchanged between Lapid and the *haredim* are so frequent that the story was considered nothing special here.

Shinui's strong showing was one of the many surprises of this surprising election. Its representation in the Knesset soared from 6 to 15 seats. American conservatives, who have fought anti-religious bigotry on the part of the press and the elites for



decades, might be inclined to think Shinui is an Israeli version of People for the American Way. But in truth, the religious parties Shinui opposes play a role in Israeli politics more akin to Al Sharpton than Ralph Reed. From the earliest days of Israel, they have demanded and received preferential treatment for their constituents from the government, including exemption from military service.

The black-nationalist analogy becomes even clearer in the case of the Shas party, whose appeal is explicitly tied both to religious and ethnic

resentment. Its 1996 campaign slogan was "Shas: It's not a platform, it's an identity." The identity is North African. Shas voters tend to be darker-skinned Jews of North African descent who feel that they are treated like second-class citizens by lighter-skinned Jews of European descent. Thus, the Sharpton-like statement of Shas campaign manager Itzik Sudri in the *Jerusalem Post* before the election: "Only a strong and powerful Shas can curb the blatant white aggression!"

Shas is under the control of Rabbi Ovadia Yosef, who was once the chief Sephardic rabbi of Israel. Rav Ovadia, as he's known, is now nothing more or less than the Louis Farrakhan of Israel—only he casts the Ashkenazi Jews of European origin in the role of "white devil." Rav Ovadia said the victims of the Holocaust were recipients of God's justice. He compared leftist politician Yossi Sarid to Haman, the Hitler-like figure in the Book of Esther.

Opponents like these make Shinui's Lapid sound almost like an Israeli Ward Connerly. Only he's denouncing religious instead of race preferences: "We are not against . . . religious Jews. We are against the exploitation of religion for money and power. . . . We want equal rights for equal duties for all citizens."

Last week, Shinui rose and Shas fell. Shas lost 6 of its 17 seats, and would have lost more were it not for a crass and complicated vote-buying scandal that beset Prime Minister Ariel Sharon's Likud party. Sharon's single failure in this election was his inability to bring more Shas voters to his side.

Otherwise, the size of Sharon's victory was astounding to his supporters and his foes alike. Sharon and Likud got twice the votes of its nearest competitor. Likud received 400,000 more votes than it had in parliamentary elections four years ago, and doubled the number of seats it will hold in the Knesset from 19 to 38. Five years ago,

*John Podhoretz is a columnist for the New York Post and a contributing editor to THE WEEKLY STANDARD.*

it would have seemed absurd to think that the most controversial man in Israel's political history could ever achieve a landslide of this magnitude. Outside of Israel, the reality still seems inconceivable.

Forget Saddam Hussein and Kim Jong Il: If you had to name the most reviled leader in the world today, the winner hands-down would be Ariel Sharon. The views of the European intelligentsia are entirely congruent with those of the most radical elements in the Muslim world on the subject of Israel's prime minister. Sharon is a Nazi, a genocidal maniac, a war criminal of limitless culpability. He wishes to subjugate Palestinians, to steal their land, to humiliate them and, for good measure, eliminate them from the face of the earth.

Sharon has it within his power to create a government that would only heighten Europe's lurid fantasies about him. Overall, the election results have given him the option of forming a new parliamentary majority with parties of the Right alone. Likud and the Right Bloc together would have an eight-seat advantage, a very comfortable margin by Israeli standards.

Such a government would unite Sharon's Likud with everybody in Israel who opposes the creation of a Palestinian state. Some on the Israeli right believe Israel's sovereignty over the West Bank and Gaza is ordained by God. Others believe a "Greater Israel" is the logical fulfillment of the Zionist dream—that it's the manifest destiny of the Jewish people to establish dominion over all the land west of the Jordan River. Still others believe the annexation of the territories taken in the Six Day War of 1967 is necessary because there will never be a time when an Israeli deal with Arab leaders will lead to anything but more Jewish bloodshed.

The demonic Sharon of European and Muslim fantasy would go for such an ingathering of the right in a heartbeat. After all, his enemies believe Sharon's goal in life is the destruction of Palestinian aspirations. How better to achieve this aim than

by making common cause with his own natural allies in Israel?

There's one problem with this portrait of Sharon: Aside from its libelous and anti-Semitic overtones, it gets the man entirely wrong. Sharon already had his chance to form such a government last fall when the Labor party pulled out of his unity government (in a move so stupid it deserves to be classed with the Paul Wellstone funeral in the annals of self-inflicted political wounds).

Sharon could simply have added a right-wing party called National Union to the mix to keep his government going a few months ago. He chose new elections instead, for two reasons. First, he believed he could strengthen Likud's position. Second, he believed that the electoral results would serve as a referendum on his conduct as prime minister—and on his startling acknowledgment last year that a Palestinian state was inevitable and was something he could live with.

For saying this, Sharon was immediately attacked within Likud by his chief rival, former prime minister Bibi Netanyahu. Sharon found himself in a surprisingly difficult battle to maintain his chairmanship of the party. The easiest way for him to fight off Bibi would have been to go back on his words about a Palestinian state. Instead, he repeated them on several occasions.

In other words, Sharon first appeared before his own party and then before the Israeli people in successive campaigns as a believer in Palestinian statehood. He is not an unconditional supporter of the idea. He will not move on it until Yasser Arafat is deposed and until there are democratic reforms in the Palestinian Authority. He will not permit the new state to have a military. He will not cede the entire West Bank to the Palestinians. And he will not give up an inch of Jerusalem.

This is what you might call the centrist position on statehood. The leftist position is statehood almost without conditions. The rightist position is no statehood at all. Sharon

gambled that his views on this matter reflected Israeli public opinion more profoundly than any other view, and he gambled correctly.

The government he wants to form is a government of the center. He wants Shinui especially, because Shinui's views on the Palestinians dovetail most closely with his. But Shinui and Likud together have only 52 seats. Add in the reformist Yisrael b'Aliya party run by Natan Sharansky, and you have 54 seats. Sharon needs another 7 at minimum to form a government.

The problem is that it will be almost impossible to run a government with both Shinui and Shas in it, for obvious reasons. Should they annoy each other too greatly, one will pull out and the government will fall. The other religious parties pose a similar coalition problem.

Thus, Sharon's ambitions are leading him to court not the rejectionist Right, but the dovish Left. He is doing everything he can to compel the Labor party, which is a shell of its former self at a mere 19 seats, to join with him again in a unity government. Most of the leaders of Labor don't want to join his government. Their hatred of Sharon borders on the pathological—perhaps because they understand that he may be on the verge of usurping their signature issue and entering the history books as the Israeli prime minister who brought about the creation of a Palestinian state.

Israel is still a nation at war, and may soon face its greatest threat in decades. War in Iraq could embolden Yasser Arafat and others to unleash a terror barrage on Israel (not to mention Saddam and his Scuds). The danger will create emergency conditions under which all major parties will be invited to join the government as a display of unity. No matter their feelings about Sharon, they will have to accept.

Sharon will then have cause to sing about how happy and pleasant it is for brethren to join in unity. Nobody else will be singing *Hinei Ma Tov* along with him, but that's Israel for you. ♦



---

# The End of Appeasement

*Bush's opportunity to redeem  
America's past failures in the Middle East*

---

BY MAX BOOT

Following Hans Blix's devastating report and President Bush's compelling State of the Union address, Saddam Hussein looks more and more like a dead man walking. In all likelihood, Baghdad will be liberated by April. This may turn out to be one of those hinge moments in history—events like the storming of the Bastille or the fall of the Berlin Wall—after which everything is different. If the occupation goes well (admittedly a big if), it may mark the moment when the powerful antibiotic known as democracy was introduced into the diseased environment of the Middle East, and began to transform the region for the better. For the United States, this represents perhaps the last, best chance to do what it has singularly failed to do since World War II—to provide the Middle East with effective imperial oversight. It is not entirely America's fault, but our mismanagement and misconceptions have allowed a backward, once insignificant region to become arguably the main threat to the security of the United States and the entire West.

In centuries past, the wild and unruly passions of the Islamic world were kept within tight confines by firm, often ruthless imperial authority, mainly Ottoman, but, starting in the late 19th century, increasingly British and French. These distant masters did not always rule wisely or well, but they generally prevented the region from menacing the security of the outside world. When the pirates of the Barbary Coast (as Europeans called North Africa) could not be dealt with by the payment of ransom, the new American republic, and then the Europeans, took matters into their own hands. Ultimately, Algiers, Tripoli, Morocco, and Tunis were colonized, and thus ended their

piratical threat. When a group of Egyptian army officers led by an early-day Nasser named Arabi Pasha tried to seize power in 1882, the British occupied the country, and wound up administering it from behind the scenes for decades to come. When a fanatical Islamic sect led by a self-proclaimed Mahdi (or messiah) took over the Sudan, and threatened to spread its extremist violence throughout the Islamic world, Gen. Horatio Herbert Kitchener snuffed out the movement in a hail of gunfire at the Battle of Omdurman in 1898. When a pro-Nazi regime took power in Baghdad in 1941, the British intervened to topple the offending dictator, Rashid Ali.

Strong medicine, that. And no longer considered acceptable in today's post-colonial world. As America slowly took over Britain's oversight role after 1945, Washington tried self-consciously to carve out a different style of leadership, one that was meant to distinguish the virtuous Americans from the grasping, greedy imperialists who had come before. America wanted to show that it sympathized with the Arabs, Persians, and Muslims, had no designs on their lands or oil wealth, and would not even choose sides in their struggle to eradicate the nascent state of Israel. Unfortunately America showed something else—that we were weak, and could be attacked, economically and physically and rhetorically, with impunity. That we were a paper tiger—or, to use Osama bin Laden's metaphor, a “weak horse.” “When people see a strong horse and a weak horse,” the leader of al Qaeda has said, “by nature they will like the strong horse.” It is no wonder that America today has so few real friends in the region. Why would anyone ride alongside a weak horse?

This may seem an odd statement to make, since America is often accused of being a bully, in the Mideast as elsewhere. Yet the record shows precious little bullying—indeed not enough. Note that the last time the United States played a pivotal role in a Mideast change of government (if one overlooks Bill Clinton's campaign against Benjamin Netanyahu in Israel's 1999 election) was in

---

*Contributing editor Max Boot is an Olin senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations and the author of The Savage Wars of Peace: Small Wars and the Rise of American Power.*

1953, when the CIA, along with Britain's MI6, helped to depose Iranian prime minister Mohammed Mossadegh. Considering how many violently anti-American regimes have existed in the Middle East since World War II, America's failure to overthrow more of them is a testament to our passivity and forbearance.

This is not to suggest that the U.S. record in the Mideast during the past 50 years has been exclusively weak and pusillanimous. There have been occasional flashes of principle and infrequent displays of strength. Some of the more prominent include: Truman's ultimatum that forced the Soviets to evacuate Iran in 1946 and his decision two years later to override all his foreign policy advisers by recognizing Israel; Eisenhower's dispatch of Marines to support the Lebanese government in 1958; Nixon and Kissinger's backing of Israel with emergency arms shipments during the 1973 Yom Kippur War; Reagan's bombing of Libya in 1986 and protection of Gulf shipping from Iranian attacks in 1987-88; and, most recently, George H.W. Bush's resounding victory in the Persian Gulf War of 1991. All these actions are very much to America's credit, and have done much to serve U.S. interests in the region.

Unfortunately America's record of failure is more glaring, starting with the Suez Crisis, continuing in the run-up to the Six Day War, the oil crisis of the 1970s, the Iranian revolution, subsequent terrorist attacks against the United States by radical Islamists, and the failure to depose Saddam Hussein. A broad generalization may stretch the truth but not break it: America was strong in resisting Soviet designs on the region but weak in the face of Arab nationalism and Islamic extremism. Indeed, the United States usually sought to make common cause with Arabs and Persians against the Soviet Union. This may have been a sound short-term strategy—it did contribute to the defeat of the Evil Empire—but its unintended long-term consequence has been to leave behind a poisonous legacy of anti-Americanism, despotism, and corruption that poses a stark challenge to the 21st-century world.

## Nasser



**T**he pattern of American weakness was set early on, during the 1956 Suez Crisis, which serves as a kind of template for everything the United States has done wrong in the region for the past several decades. In the immediate run-up to the crisis, the United States tried unsuccessfully to court Gamal Abdel Nasser, who

had emerged as the leader of the group of Egyptian army officers that overthrew King Farouk in 1952. President Eisenhower thought he could lure Nasser to the Western camp by offering him support, such as loans to build the Aswan Dam, which would supply most of his country's electricity. But Nasser spurned the West by taking a prominent role at the Bandung Conference of nonaligned nations and by extending diplomatic recognition to the People's Republic of China. His radio station, the Voice of the Arabs, blared out a daily stream of vituperation against the West and its friends in the region, while Nasser's agents tried to subvert these "lackeys of imperialism." Like most dictators, Nasser gave top priority to getting his hands on copious stockpiles of weapons. When Washington, not wanting to fuel a regional arms race, refused to provide them, he turned to the Soviet bloc.

In 1955 the Kremlin agreed, through its Czech puppets, to supply Nasser with an awesome array of weaponry including 200 jet airplanes and 100 tanks. This would have tilted the regional balance of power sharply against Israel, which possessed only 20 jet aircraft of its own. Prime Minister David Ben Gurion asked Washington to guarantee Israel's security and supply it with weapons to counter the growing Egyptian threat. Eisenhower and his secretary of state, John Foster Dulles, refused. Their policy was centered on the Alpha Project, one of countless American attempts to broker peace between Israel and its enemies. In their pursuit of this chimerical goal, Eisenhower and Dulles decided that Israel would get no security assistance from the United States until a full settlement had been reached with the Arabs.

Such a settlement is still elusive almost 50 years later, but in the meantime Israel faced a pressing danger. The Israel Defense Forces estimated that Czech weapons would begin flowing to Egypt by November 1955, and that it would take six to eight months for the Egyptians to assimilate the inflow. Chief of Staff Moshe Dayan calculated that Egypt would be ready to attack Israel by late spring 1956. Already the danger loomed; Nasser was sponsoring guerrilla raids into Israel, blockading the southern Israeli port of Eilat, and not allowing Israeli shipping access to the Suez Canal.

Since Washington would not help, Israel turned to states that would—first France and then Britain. They had their own beef with Nasser, who on July 26, 1956, nationalized the Suez Canal Company. The canal, which was owned (and had been built) by an Anglo-French consortium, was the transit point for two-thirds of Europe's oil supplies. Neither London nor Paris was willing to cede control of this vital waterway to a power-mad dictator who was increasingly allied with the Communist bloc.

Since Washington was not interested in helping its closest allies, they got together with Israel, and in the secret Protocol of Sèvres, agreed on a joint operation to seize the canal and overthrow Nasser.

The plan began to unfold on October 29, 1956, when Israeli forces moved into the Sinai desert, effortlessly overrunning Egyptian positions. France and Britain issued an ultimatum calling on both sides to stop fighting and pull back 10 miles from the canal. Israel agreed, but Egypt didn't, and on October 31, Anglo-French forces began bombing Egyptian military positions. A few days later, on November 5, they occupied Port Said, which controlled the Mediterranean entrance to the canal, with little resistance. Nasser responded by scuttling old ships filled with cement to block the canal. His allies in Damascus sabotaged the oil pipeline linking Iraq to the Mediterranean, thus interrupting a major source of Europe's oil supplies. Saudi Arabia embargoed oil shipments to France and Britain, and acts of sabotage shut down Kuwait's supply system.

A looming oil shortage could have been averted with continued military action by Israel, France, and Britain to open the canal and overthrow Nasser. The inept Egyptian armed forces posed little obstacle. But the allies could not cope with the overwhelming pressure brought by President Eisenhower, who didn't want to "get the Arabs sore at all of us" and who was eager to paint the United States as opposed to imperialism, whether conducted by the Soviet Union in Hungary or by France and Britain in Egypt. There was little Washington could or would do to force the Soviet Union to disgorge Hungary, but America had plenty of leverage with its allies, and didn't hesitate to use it.

Ike began by pushing a resolution through the United Nations demanding the British, Israeli, and French troops withdraw immediately. When Britain balked, Eisenhower tightened the economic screws. The crisis was causing a run on sterling and a major depletion of Britain's scant oil reserves, which, if allowed to continue, would lead to an economic meltdown. The United States had contingency plans to provide loans and emergency oil supplies to Britain, but Eisenhower refused to activate them as long as British troops remained in Egypt. He wanted to force the British and French "to work out their own oil problem—to boil in their own oil, so to speak." Faced with unrelenting pressure from their most powerful benefactor, Britain, France, and Israel had no choice but to withdraw.

British prime minister Anthony Eden complained in his memoirs, with considerable justice, "In recent years the United States has sometimes failed to put its weight behind its friends, in the hope of being popular with their

foes." At first this cynical gambit—precisely what the United States often accuses its European allies of doing—seemed to pay dividends. U.N. ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge reported to Eisenhower that he was deluged with support from Third World countries—and not just from their diplomats. Even U.N. busboys, typists, and elevator operators, Lodge crowed, "have been offering their congratulations." But the outpourings of support quickly faded, to be replaced by the same sullen resentment, envy, and hatred that had once been directed against the British and the French.

**T**he immediate impact of the Suez Crisis was to give a major impetus to Nasser in his grandiose plans to unite the entire Arab world under his tyrannical rule. He was seen as the first Arab in hundreds of years to have defeated the forces of Christendom. Britain, France, and America were perceived to be on the run. Pro-Western rulers were deemed to be puppets ripe for elimination.

In the spring of 1957, Nasserite army officers tried, and failed, to overthrow King Hussein of Jordan. Arab nationalists were more successful in Iraq, where the Hashemite royal family was murdered in a 1958 coup d'état. That same year Egypt and Syria combined to form the United Arab Republic, which received substantial military support from the USSR. Eisenhower sensed, too late, the Nasserite danger, and proclaimed the Eisenhower Doctrine to help friendly Middle Eastern regimes. In 1958, as part of this doctrine, he landed 15,000 Marines in Beirut to stabilize the Christian government against a Muslim uprising. But while this may have helped keep Lebanon out of Nasserite hands, it did not discourage Nasser from further adventurism. In 1962 he dispatched 50,000 troops to Yemen, where they became embroiled in a civil war against the Saudi-backed monarchy.

A few years later Nasser turned his attention back to the "Zionist entity." Following the 1956 war, the United States had forced Israel to disgorge its territorial gains in the Sinai. To assuage Israel's security concerns, a U.N. peacekeeping force was inserted into the area. On May 16, 1967, Nasser asked the U.N. to remove its troops, and Secretary General U Thant cravenly complied. Nothing now stood in the way of Egyptian troops, who massed near Israel's border. Five days later, Nasser announced that he was closing the Straits of Tiran, thus keeping Israeli shipping out of the Gulf of Aqaba, its only outlet to the Red Sea. This was a blatant violation of international law. But although President Johnson declared Nasser's action illegal, he did not order the U.S. Navy to run the blockade and preserve the freedom of the seas—as Eisenhower had



pledged ten years before that America would do if the straits were ever closed. Johnson counseled Levi Eshkol not to take matters into his own hands, either, but the Israeli prime minister decided he had no choice. On June 5, Israel launched a series of lightning strikes against its neighbors that delivered a resounding victory in just six days. This was the second straight Arab-Israeli war that the United States had failed to prevent by not offering firm support to Israel beforehand. By jollying Nasser along, Washington had only encouraged his far-flung designs.

The United States likewise did little to forestall Egypt's next attempt to wipe Israel off the map, which occurred during the Yom Kippur holiday in 1973. But at least the Nixon administration, to its great credit, rushed emergency deliveries of arms to Israel when it appeared that the Jewish state stood on the brink of annihilation. Nixon and his secretary of state, Henry Kissinger, hoped to maintain a public stance of neutrality by hiding these arms shipments from the Arab states. But the ruse fell apart when foul weather delayed some giant C-5A transport planes laden with U.S. military supplies. They were supposed to land in Israel under cover of darkness; instead they descended in the middle of the day on October 14, their insignia clear for all to see. Before long America was embroiled in its next Middle East crisis—this one centered on the oil-producing states of the Persian Gulf.

Just as the United States had done a poor job of assuming Britain's imperial role in Egypt, so now it did an equally poor job in the Gulf.



## The Sheikhs

Prime Minister Harold Wilson announced in 1968 that Britain was withdrawing from its military commitments “east of Suez.” The Pax Britannica was defunct, the Pax Americana did not yet exist. The small Gulf states—Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Bahrain, and what would become the United Arab Emirates—were on their own. Deprived, against their will, of British protection, the sheikhs had to make common cause with their large, dangerous neighbors. It is perhaps no coincidence that within two years of the final British pullout in 1971, these Gulf states were presenting a major challenge to the West. The British pullout had left a power vacuum that the United States, embroiled in Vietnam and, before long, Watergate, was unable to fill. Instead President Nixon

outsourced the protection of the Gulf to America's great friends, the shah of Iran and the king of Saudi Arabia, who became two of the world's biggest buyers of U.S. arms. Nixon saw them as “Twin Pillars” of stability in the region, but they were also twin pillars of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries.

OPEC, formed in 1960, had little success in controlling oil prices, because non-OPEC oil reserves, especially in the United States, had produced a lot of excess capacity. But by the early 1970s, fast economic growth in Japan, Western Europe, and the United States had strained oil stocks. Now there was little give in the market, leaving the oil-producing states maximum leverage to raise prices.

The OPEC countries were ready to seize the moment, having already nationalized their oil industries. Oil fields across the world had been developed at great risk and expense by Western oil companies. At the stroke of a pen, various dictators in effect stole these assets—and heard nary a peep of protest from Washington. The trend had begun in Mexico in the 1930s and spread to the Middle East in 1951, when Prime Minister Mossadegh crafted, and the shah signed, a law nationalizing Iran's oil industry. All British oil company employees were summarily booted out of the country.

This decision, which occurred amid turmoil and violence (a previous, anti-nationalization prime minister had been assassinated by Islamic terrorists), caused great consternation in London, since a British company (Anglo-Iranian, forerunner of British Petroleum) held the Iranian oil concession. But Washington nixed Prime Minister Clement Atlee's plans for military intervention to take back Anglo-Iranian's refineries. The United States got involved in toppling Mossadegh by covert means only when efforts to work out a diplomatic solution had gotten nowhere, and it appeared that “Mossy's” chaotic rule might provide an opening for Tudeh, as the Iranian Communist party was known. The combined CIA-MI6 operation (code-named Ajax, and run by Kermit Roosevelt) wouldn't have worked had it not been for declining popular support for Mossadegh and a resurgence of backing for the shah, who, under Iran's constitution, was well within his rights to sack his prime minister.

But the return of Muhammad Reza Shah Pahlavi to real power did not result in the privatization of the Iranian oil industry. The shah did sign a contract with a multinational consortium of oil companies (including Anglo-Iranian) to manage Iran's production, but his government retained ownership. As Daniel Yergin recounts in his invaluable history *The Prize*, this helped establish the principle that oil assets would not be privately held, a principle that other states enthusiastically applied in the

years ahead. By the mid-1970s, Algeria, Libya, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Venezuela had nationalized their oil industries, usually offering the previous owners a pittance in compensation. This was not just a financial loss for the West; it turned into a major strategic problem, for it created the “oil weapon” that OPEC wielded with great gusto.

In 1973 the Arab members of OPEC announced an embargo on oil shipments to the United States and the Netherlands to punish America for its support of Israel. This produced an immediate shock in America, with lines snaking around the block at many gas stations—when gas was available at all. Two ironies made this especially humiliating: The Gulf states were cutting off oil shipments to the U.S. Navy, which protected them; and the embargo had to be carried out by American companies, which still ran many oil fields under contract to the exporting states. Painful as it was, the selective embargo did not work very well. Oil is a fungible commodity, and America and the Netherlands were able to buy most of what they needed from other sources. Realizing that the embargo was failing, OPEC abandoned it in 1974.

But the oil cartel, led by the shah, was more successful in its attempts to ratchet up prices by ratcheting down production: Prices spiked from \$3 a barrel in 1970 to a whopping \$30 a barrel in 1980. As oil prices went up, the U.S. economy went down, afflicted by a horrible combination of stagnation and inflation that came to be known as “stagflation.” These economic woes were exacerbated by the ham-handed U.S. government response, which under Presidents Nixon, Ford, and Carter primarily consisted of government-imposed rationing, price controls, and a “windfall profits” tax that interfered with the functioning of the market. But there was no question that the primary culprits were to be found around a meeting table in Vienna. OPEC held the Western economy hostage.

Rather pitifully, Washington pleaded with its friends in the region to exert their influence to bring down prices, but the Twin Pillars, the Saudi king and the shah, usually turned a deaf ear to American entreaties. “There are some people who thought—and perhaps some who still think—that I am a toy in the Americans’ hands,” the shah said in 1975. “Why would I accept to be a toy? There are reasons for our power which will make us stronger, so why would we be content to be someone else’s catspaw?” Odd talk coming from a man whose survival—like that of the Saudi royal family—depended, in the final instance, on American military protection. But the shah and the Saudis were more eager to appease nationalist and Islamic radicals who called for a united Arab front against the “Zionist oppressors” and “Western imperialists.” The cost of crossing the extremists was too

great; the Saudis got a taste of what they could expect when, in the spring of 1973, terrorists attacked one of their refineries and pipelines. The royal family decided to buy off the extremists, even if it meant offending Washington. But then they did not especially fear the wrath of the Americans. They figured—rightly, as it turned out—that the United States would do little to undermine their governments because it feared that the alternative, whether Nasserite or fundamentalist, would be worse.

Just as the OPEC potentates expected, the United States submitted supinely to economic blackmail. The U.S. government made no attempt to take back by force the oil fields confiscated by various Middle Eastern despots. Washington did not even try to prosecute OPEC for blatant violations of antitrust law, as it has done with other overseas cartels such as De Beers. Doing so might have required legislation to lift the “sovereign immunity” provision that protects foreign governments, under most circumstances, from being sued in U.S. courts. This would have been perfectly possible for Congress to do—if any administration had pushed for such legislation. But none did. Numerous bills to allow OPEC to be sued have died in Congress, the most recent being legislation sponsored in 2001 by Rep. Ben Gilman. The result is that De Beers executives are afraid to visit the United States for fear of being arrested or served with legal papers. But OPEC sheikhs, who rig the price of a commodity far more important than diamonds, are able to come to the United States whenever they desire access to physicians, chefs, or prostitutes superior to those available in the Arab world. They also feel free to keep vast amounts of money in the U.S. financial system without fear of having their assets frozen.

By the 1980s, the oil crisis had passed, having inflicted great damage on the economies of the West. Saudi Arabia, with the largest oil reserves in the world, earned Washington’s gratitude for moderating prices, much as a local Mafia boss might earn the gratitude of a bodega owner whose shop he refrained from destroying. But the Saudi pressure on fellow OPEC states not to raise prices too high, while presented to credulous Washington policymakers as a great favor to America, was in reality self-serving: Riyadh was afraid that if it priced its oil out of the market the result would be a slackening of demand and the development of alternative energy sources. That is precisely what happened during the 1970s oil crisis, which made it profitable for Britain and Norway to extract high-cost oil from the North Sea.

Generations of Washington policymakers have fooled themselves into thinking that Saudi oil revenues could be

directed for friendly purposes. This illusion was easy to sustain in the 1980s when the Saudis, for their own theological purposes, bankrolled anti-Soviet mujahedeen in Afghanistan. Again, this was presented by Riyadh as a great favor to Washington, but was actually in the Saudis' interest, since it was designed to court favor with Islamic extremists both at home and abroad. Since September 11, 2001, it has become obvious that significant sums in petrodollars have gone to fund virulently anti-Western madrassas around the world or have found their way into the pockets of outright terrorists like Osama bin Laden, himself a Saudi. This places OPEC's activities—previously seen merely as greed run amok—in a rather more sinister light. The Saudis and the rest weren't just out to make a buck; they were also out, like Nasser before them, to assert Arab and Islamic power at the expense of the West. And successive American administrations—obsessed, understandably, with the Soviet threat—did little to stop them.



By the late 1970s, Nasserite pan-Arabism was a spent force; Anwar Sadat, Nasser's successor, conceded as much by reaching a peace agreement with Israel. But there now arose a new and even more virulent threat to the United States in the form of Islamism, a violent creed that blended elements of fundamentalist Islam with a power-centered ideology inspired by fascism and communism. The catalyst for its rise was the 1979 Iranian revolution which overthrew America's great friend, the shah. The Carter administration did little to help the shah, hoping thereby to woo support among the revolutionaries. But the hard-liners effectively foreclosed this possibility on November 4, 1979, when they invaded the U.S. embassy in Tehran.

Seventy-nine years earlier, when hordes of fanatical Boxers had invaded the Legation Quarter in Peking, America, Japan, and the leading nations of Europe had dispatched a large expeditionary force to march on the Chinese capital and liberate the besieged diplomats. But Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini had no fear of an American army marching on Tehran. "Our youth should be confident that America cannot do a damn thing," he told his followers three days after the embassy takeover. "America is far too impotent to interfere in a military way here. If they could have interfered, they would have retained the shah."

The ayatollah was right. Jimmy Carter contented himself with imposing ineffectual diplomatic and economic sanctions. Only after nearly five months of "America held hostage" did Carter attempt a rescue mission, and the pathetic Eagle Claw expedition had to be aborted on April 25, 1980, after two aircraft collided at a rendezvous point code-named Desert One. The president rejected suggestions to invade Iran, or at the very least, bombard or capture its oil facilities and other important targets. This, it was feared, would lead to the hostages' being killed.

Carter's gambit paid off to the extent that all 52 hostages were released alive. But by showing such restraint, Carter ensured that many more Americans would be kidnapped and killed in the future.

Years later, one of the embassy guards, former Marine Sgt. Rodney Sickmann, regretted that he'd been ordered not to fire so much as a tear gas canister at the embassy invaders. "Had we opened fire on them maybe we would only have lasted an hour," he told the *New York Times* in 2002. But "we could have changed history" by showing that Americans could not be attacked with impunity. Instead the embassy surrender showed that Americans were easy targets. "If you look back, it started in 1979; it's just escalated," Sickmann says.

The escalation occurred first in Saudi Arabia and Egypt. In 1979 Islamist radicals briefly seized the Grand Mosque in Mecca, and in 1981 they assassinated Anwar Sadat. The Levant soon became a major focus of their operations.

In the late 1970s and early 1980s, the Palestine Liberation Organization—a secular organization but one that often cooperated with Islamist groups—used southern Lebanon as a base from which to attack Israel. Israel responded by invading Lebanon in 1982, putting the PLO fighters on the run and trapping them in Beirut. At this point, the United States, as so often in the past, intervened to prevent Israel from winning a complete victory against its sworn enemies. President Reagan pressured Prime Minister Menachem Begin to rein in his troops and let Yasser Arafat and his followers leave Lebanon, preserving them to fight another day. To supervise the evacuation of 8,000 Fatah fighters, the United States, along with France and Italy, landed a small peacekeeping force in Beirut. Though this force was soon evacuated, the three countries decided to send a larger force back after the massacre at the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps to help the Lebanese government restore some semblance of control over a country torn by civil war. Unfortunately this only increased the number of targets available for Iranian-backed Islamists who were openly waging war on the Great Satan.



The death toll mounted fast. On April 18, 1983, a Shiite suicide bomber struck the U.S. embassy in Beirut, killing 63 people, 17 Americans among them, including both the CIA station chief and his deputy. On October 23 of that year, another Shiite suicide bomber hit the U.S. Marine barracks in Beirut, killing 241 soldiers. In the face of this attack, the Reagan administration revealed itself to be no more muscular than its Democratic predecessor had been. After the battleship *New Jersey* hurled a few Volkswagen-sized shells into the hills above Beirut, President Reagan announced that the remaining Marines would be “redeployed” to ships offshore. This sent a loud and clear message to America’s enemies: The Americans are weak. Kill a few of them, and you can chase them out of your country.

The image of American impotence was reinforced by the continuing hostage crisis in Lebanon. Having learned in 1979 that taking American hostages pays, the Iranians decided to turn this into a major business. With the complicity of Syria, the Iranians directed their Hezbollah proxies to kidnap and kill a steady stream of Westerners. Among those seized and murdered were William Buckley, the new CIA station chief in Beirut, and Marine Colonel William Higgins, chief of a U.N. peacekeeping force.

It did not require Hercule Poirot to see Iranian fingerprints all over these operations. Many of the kidnap victims were held at the Sheik Abdallah Barracks in the Lebanese town of Baalbek, which had been taken over as a base of operations by uniformed members of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, the Pasdaran. One of the early hostages—David Dodge, acting president of the American University Beirut, who was abducted on July 19, 1982—was transported first to Damascus, and then, from there, to Tehran via Iran Air. He was held in the Iranian capital for six months before being released. None of this was a secret at the time; Robert Baer, a former CIA case officer, recounts in his gripping memoir, *See No Evil*, how in October 1984 he visited Baalbek and even saw the barracks where he suspected (rightly, as it turned out) that Buckley and five other Westerners were imprisoned.

Washington’s ineffectual response in the face of this aggression boggles the mind. The Reagan administration did briefly bomb Libya in 1986, in response to an attack on a Berlin disco, but these pinprick airstrikes only enraged Muammar Qaddafi, whose agents, in retaliation, destroyed Pan Am flight 103 in 1988, killing 270 people. More significantly, the Reagan administration did not punish Damascus or Tehran, which were bigger sponsors of anti-American terrorism than Tripoli. It did not even dispatch Delta Force to Baalbek to free the captives and

kill their kidnappers. Instead it provided the Iranian mullahs with arms in exchange for hostages, making a mockery of America’s traditional policy of not dealing with terrorists. This policy was not even very successful on its face: Repeated American deliveries of thousands of missiles induced Iran to release just three hostages.



America was an equal opportunity appeaser. While trying to buy off Iran, it was also backing Iran’s mortal enemy, Iraq, during their war in the 1980s. This was a justifiable realpolitik policy designed to forestall Iranian domination of the Persian Gulf, and included a limited war to protect Kuwaiti tankers from Iranian attacks in 1987-88. As part of this “tanker war,” the USS *Vincennes* shot down an Iranian passenger airliner on July 3, 1988. It was an accident, but conspiracy-minded Iranians thought it a deliberate expression of a new get-tough approach by that cowboy Ronald Reagan. Within a month, Tehran had concluded a cease-fire with Iraq—an odd testament to the far-reaching results that even the inadvertent and misguided flexing of American muscle could achieve in the Middle East.

Unfortunately, America continued catering to Saddam Hussein even after the Iran-Iraq War was over. On July 25, 1990, U.S. Ambassador April Glaspie had an infamous meeting with Saddam in which she informed the Iraqi dictator that the United States had “no opinion on Arab-Arab conflicts, like your border disagreement with Kuwait.” Saddam took this as a green light for his invasion of his tiny neighbor, which began a week later. It turned out that his expectation of American acquiescence—based not only on his conversation with Glaspie but also on his reading of events of the previous three decades, going all the way back to Suez in 1956—was not justified. President Bush, with a prompt from Margaret Thatcher, mobilized an impressive coalition to kick Iraq out of Kuwait. Desert Storm turned into one of the most one-sided wars in history.

It was America’s shining hour—a victory that might have erased years of failure in the Middle East. Except that Bush refused to follow the logic of military victory to its natural political outcome; he ended the ground war after just 100 hours, while the Republican Guard remained intact and Saddam remained in power. In the cease-fire that followed, General Norman Schwarzkopf unwisely allowed Saddam’s forces to fly helicopters over

the parts of Iraq they still controlled. Those helicopters helped Saddam slaughter Shiites and Kurds who had risen up against his rule—at American instigation—in great numbers. American prestige instantly plummeted from the heights it had attained just a few weeks before. And no wonder. Here was the mighty American army sitting idle, while nearby rivers ran red with the blood of their allies.

This inaction in the face of Saddam's provocations would be repeated time and again in the 1990s. Saddam plotted to kill George H.W. Bush in 1993; in retaliation, President Clinton unleashed America's full wrath . . . to flatten an empty intelligence headquarters. The U.S. government hatched a plot to overthrow Saddam in 1995, only to pull out at the last minute, and leave its Kurdish friends to either cut deals with the dictator, flee, or be killed. Saddam stopped cooperating with U.N. weapons inspectors in 1998; in response, the United States and Britain bombed Iraq for all of four days. None of this made an appreciable dent in Saddam's dictatorship. This failure suggested to conspiracy-minded Middle Easterners either that the United States secretly wanted to maintain Saddam in power for some nefarious purpose, or that it feared the Iraqi dictator. Either way, the vacillating U.S. policy on Iraq signaled a fatal lack of seriousness on America's part.



## Al Qaeda

**T**his impression was reinforced in the 1990s by America's failure to take stern steps against the terrorists who waged war against it. Continuing a campaign that began in 1979, Islamist operatives bombed the World Trade Center in 1993, two U.S. embassies in Africa in 1998, and the USS *Cole* in 2000. Hezbollah attacked a Saudi National Guard facility in Riyadh in 1995, killing five Americans, and the Khobar Towers barracks in 1996, killing 19 Americans. Al Qaeda also claimed credit for working with local tribesmen to kill 18 American soldiers in Mogadishu in 1993, driving U.S. forces out of Somalia. Daniel Pipes estimates that even before the costliest terrorist strike in history occurred on September 11, 2001, Islamist violence directed at Americans had killed 800 people—"more than killed by any other enemy since the Vietnam War."

Yet, as Pipes notes, "these murders hardly registered." Successive administrations, Republican and Democratic alike, treated them not as an ongoing war but as a matter

for the criminal justice system. Bob Woodward's new book, *Bush at War*, reveals that during the Clinton administration, a group of Afghan agents hired by the CIA to shadow Osama bin Laden offered to kill the al Qaeda leader. The agency refused to authorize the mission, because it would have violated the executive ban on assassinations.

Such unwarranted restraint demoralized America's friends in the region and emboldened our enemies. Looking at how America was chased out of Vietnam, Lebanon, and Somalia, bin Laden and his minions thought they saw an explanation for America's inaction: The United States was too weak and decadent to resist the jihadists. "We no longer fear the so-called Great Powers," bin Laden proclaimed in a 2000 recruitment video for al Qaeda.

We believe that America is much weaker than Russia; and our brothers who fought in Somalia told us they were astonished to observe how weak, impotent and cowardly the American soldier is. As soon as eighty [sic] American troops were killed, they fled in the dark as fast as they could, after making a great noise about the new international order. America's nightmares in Vietnam and Lebanon will pale by comparison with the forthcoming victory in al-Hijaz.

Presumably the campaign in Afghanistan disabused al Qaeda of some of these illusions—but not all. The toppling of the Taliban was a good start, but only a start. A bigger test now awaits us in Iraq. America's "friends" in the region fear that American troops will march on Baghdad and install a democratic government, something that would undermine their own grip on power. They couch this fear in the language of "stability"—toppling Saddam, they counsel, would foster "instability" in the region. This is actually the best reason to liberate Iraq. The "stability" of the region produced September 11. There is no guarantee what will come out of post-invasion "instability," but if the United States remains a strong player in the region, it should be considerably better than the status quo antebellum.

Beyond Iraq loom other challenges—especially Syria and Iran, which have been waging undeclared war on the United States for 20 years, but also Saudi Arabia, which has abetted this war even as it has benefited from American protection. It is possible that a U.S. victory in Iraq will intimidate these regimes into better behavior. If not, the United States will have to take more vigorous steps to align our relationships with these countries with our interests and principles. This is a major undertaking, and the necessity for it might have been averted by wiser action years ago, but the long record of U.S. futility in the Middle East now presents us with this defining task. ♦

---

# Inside a Crisis Pregnancy Center

*Lessons learned about bad fathers, young mothers, despair, and hope*

---

BY EVE TUSHNET

**T**he Capitol Hill Pregnancy Center in Washington, D.C., where I've been working as a volunteer for over a year, is a pro-life Christian ministry to pregnant women and poor families. Like most pro-life pregnancy centers, it offers free pregnancy tests, confidential counseling, referrals to outside services like child care, job banks, and housing, and basic material aid like diapers, formula, cribs, and clothes for mother and child. It also provides a childbirth class and a parenting class, and runs abstinence programs in nearby schools. CHPC is one of about 3,000 pro-life pregnancy centers in the United States, and one of some 600 in North America affiliated with the umbrella group CareNet.

Our little center is nestled in a half-gentrified residential neighborhood of Northeast Washington, 15 minutes' walk from the Capitol. We see about 1,000 clients a year, most of them under 25, virtually all of them unmarried, so our accumulated counseling experience gives us a certain perspective on the matter of why women get pregnant out of wedlock—as a record number of American women now do. (In 2001, 33.5 percent of U.S. births were to unmarried women.) We conduct extended interviews with most of our clients and usually cover a number of standard questions. In women's responses, I've noticed four main themes: fatherlessness, fatalism, an attenuated concept of marriage, and the intermittent use of contraception.

★ **"WHAT DOES THE CLIENT'S FATHER WANT HER TO DO IF SHE'S PREGNANT?"** There's a line on our counseling form for the answer to that question. I think I've filled it out once. I've counseled one or two teenagers who live with their fathers, and a handful of teens and adult

women who speak with their fathers now and then. But for most of our clients, fathers are just not there. Growing up fatherless affects how women view their own relationships and their pregnancies. Because so few of our clients have known men who consistently met their family responsibilities, they rarely demand responsibility from the men they date. Even women who want children generally view adult men as a fleeting part of the household. Men flit in and out of women's lives, exotic but untrustworthy creatures, exciting but ultimately irrelevant to the formation of a family.

We see some boyfriends who want to be responsible. But men too suffer from the lack of strong models of paternal and spousal responsibility. Our observations coincide with the findings of Jennifer F. Hamer, author of a study of the attitudes of black non-custodial fathers published under the title *What It Means to Be Daddy* (though not with her policy prescriptions). Hamer believes that marriage is not a necessary or even a superior way to harness men's desires for fatherhood. But even the men she studied who tried to be more than "absent fathers"—more than statistics—didn't do many of the things that distinguish reliable fathers. Because they didn't marry the mothers of their children, they didn't refrain from fathering children by different women (thus splitting their resources and attention, and creating "drama"), or become stable fixtures in their children's homes. Women didn't demand this—and the women's mothers sometimes even shooed the men away, viewing them as threats, rather than encouraging men who wanted to take responsibility to do so. (In my experience, mothers are also at least as likely as boyfriends to pressure their unmarried pregnant daughters to have abortions.)

The women we counsel say they want to get married, just as the men Hamer interviewed want to be good fathers, but they have little sense of how to get what they want. Having sex with "this great guy who hangs around my high school all day, he's 22, he makes me laugh" is

---

*Eve Tushnet is a freelance journalist in Washington, D.C. The views expressed here are her own and not those of the Capitol Hill Pregnancy Center.*



generally not a route to marriage. Nor does sleeping with every woman he dates prepare a man to be a reliable father. Not having good fathers themselves has left our clients more likely to fail in their ambition to make good marriages. A fatherless neighborhood quickly becomes a neighborhood of pregnancy scares. When marriage is a chimera, there's nothing to wait for, no reason to be chaste. There's nothing for a woman to demand from men, no reason for her to put "responsible" above "fun" on the checklist of qualities to look for in a potential boyfriend. When responsibility is almost unknown, where would a man acquire the notion that the best thing he can do for his girlfriend is stop having sex with her; or, if she conceives, that the best thing he can do for his child is marry and love the mother? Instead of attitudes conducive to marriage, fatherlessness fosters the second huge problem, fatalism.

★ **"WHAT LED YOU TWO TO BEGIN HAVING SEX?"** Sometimes I can't ask this question. Not every counseling session builds enough intimacy and trust to broach it. But when I do ask, there's no real answer. For our clients, having sex is the default setting; it's *not* having sex that would take a conscious decision.

The women we counsel don't speak the language of empowered young women taking control of their sexuality. Instead, they sound profoundly disempowered; they speak as if their sexuality were not in their control at all. It's not that their boyfriends bully them: They simply have no sense that a dating relationship without sex is possible. Chastity is an "alternative lifestyle" so alien as to be nearly inconceivable.

A few of the young women we counsel buck this trend. They're the ones who sound brave and determined even in their frightening situation. These few come to the center because they've slipped up after deciding to stop having sex for a while. In general, they report that abstinence improved their relationships, but the allure of sex got the better of them one night. Because they have already struggled to practice chastity, they believe it is possible. If their tests come back positive, these women's lives swerve onto paths they have not planned, but they still sound more self-possessed and self-aware than most of our clients. Loral Patchen, director of the Teen Alliance for Prepared Parenting (TAPP) at Washington Hospital Center, recently told the *Washington City Paper*, "The idea that you're going to tell anyone who's already sexually active to abstain usually isn't realistic. It isn't realistic for

adults or for kids." Our experience belies this. We see the real women behind slogans like, "It's never too late for abstinence." We've seen that there is hope for women who want to try again. The Patchen approach pushes hopelessness under the guise of realism.

★ **"WHAT ARE YOUR GOALS FOR THIS RELATIONSHIP?"** Fatherlessness warps women's views of marriage, but broader cultural trends do at least as much harm. Like so many Americans, the women we counsel view marriage not as a sacred vow, or a promise that can strengthen a relationship and help it last, but as an expensive ceremony validating but not changing a relationship. Marriage is postponed when couples can't scrounge up the money for a big wedding—confirming Miss Manners' observation that weddings become more and more elaborate as marriage becomes less and less meaningful. "We just can't afford it," is the excuse by which many cohabiting couples

disguise their ambivalence about the idea of marrying.

Because marriage is not viewed as significantly different from cohabitation, there's no reason to prefer marriage and postpone sex. Unfortunately, when the cohabiting woman misses a period, she realizes that her relationship is much less stable than she'd imagined—much shakier than a marriage.

★ **"WERE YOU USING ANY KIND OF BIRTH CONTROL?"** The women we counsel generally know about birth control. They know about condoms, the Pill, Depo-Provera. Most of them use condoms intermittently and have used hormonal birth control at some time. But half of all unintended pregnancies in the United States occur when the woman is not using birth control. We see a lot of those women. They have the usual reasons; all contraceptive options have drawbacks. They're unromantic; they're hard to use correctly; and many have unpleasant side effects. Combine these problems with the wishful belief that pregnancy happens to other people, a deep ambivalence about the man you're dating, conflicted desires about having a child, and most of all a fatalistic desire to forget about the future and go with the flow—and you have a recipe for unwanted pregnancy.

★ **"WHAT WOULD HAVE TO CHANGE IN YOUR LIFE TO MAKE YOU FEEL GOOD ABOUT HAVING THIS BABY?"** Public officials' tweaking a regulation here or funding an initiative there won't untangle the emotional roots of out-of-wedlock pregnancy. What's needed more than anything is realistic hope. Men and women need models of chastity, marriage, and fatherhood. They need to be able to imag-

*Clients whose pregnancy tests come out negative also need to be counseled. Unless they change their habits, we see them back in six months with the old anxious stare.*

ine themselves as abstinent singles or married parents, and they need to know how to make realistic plans to move toward those goals.


**H**ow can hope be provided? My experience suggests a few possibilities. Personal relationships are crucial, and neither government nor bureaucratic charities can supply them. Mentoring can. This might come through a Big Brother or Big Sister relationship, or through marriage mentoring. Some churches in well-off areas have found “sister congregations” in poor areas, holding joint celebrations and building relationships based on friendship and reciprocity rather than on one-way charity.

Pro-life pregnancy centers can focus not solely on discouraging abortion, but also on helping men and women orient their romantic lives toward marriage. Many of us were startled in our training for our work at Capitol Hill Pregnancy Center to learn that clients whose pregnancy tests came out negative also need to be counseled. We were so conditioned to view pregnancy centers as baby-savers, we’d failed to notice that virtually every negative test is also a sign that something is going wrong in a

woman’s life. Too often, women heave a sigh of relief at the results, but don’t change their habits—and are back in six months with the old anxious stare and a double load of guilt.

Sex education curricula, then, should emphasize chastity and good marriages. Both “safe sex” and “abstinence-only” curricula tend to fall into the trap of trying to scare teens with statistics on pregnancy and sexually transmitted diseases. But teens are not very interested in reducing risk, and they’re certainly not good at it. They *are* interested in romance, taking control of their relationships, and preparing for the future. Chastity counseling is what I do most often at the center.


Finally, since Capitol Hill Pregnancy Center is a Christian ministry, I should touch on religion. Almost all the women we see were raised as Christians and consider themselves Christians, but feel profoundly alienated from the heart of their faith. I’ve been surprised at how many women respond with interest and enthusiasm when they hear a brief, clear explanation of the essential Christian truths. “That makes a lot more sense,” one teen said ruefully, than the confused and diluted notions she had brought with her. Such understanding is the best weapon of all against fatalism. ♦



**DIVERSITY**  
*The Invention of a Concept*  
By Peter Wood

*"AN IMPORTANT BOOK... Constructively and with erudition, Wood addresses what is likely to be the domestic policy issue of the first half of 2003—racial preferences. Wood's book earns a place near the top of the pile of literature debunking affirmative action."*  
—The Weekly Standard

DIVERSITY IS AT THE TOP OF THE NATION'S AGENDA, the subject of a Supreme Court case that will decide the future of college admissions. It is also the subject of a brilliant new book, *Diversity: The Invention of a Concept*. No longer a word indicating variety and multiplicity, diversity has become an argument for prescribed racial and ethnic outcomes. Peter Wood shows how this concept stalked a claim on law, politics, education, business, entertainment, personal aspiration, religion and the arts. Wood has searched out the DNA of diversity and written its biography. No wonder Shelby Steele calls this "simply the best and most thorough critique of the diversity phenomenon yet written."

 ENCOUNTER BOOKS  
AT BOOKSTORES EVERYWHERE OR CALL 800-786-3839

www.encounterbooks.com

# SETTING THE STANDARD FOR GREAT PRODUCTS

## The Weekly Standard Online Store

[www.weeklystandard.com](http://www.weeklystandard.com)



Quality is something the Weekly Standard takes seriously. Our full line of Weekly Standard products reflects that commitment. Visit our website at [www.weeklystandard.com](http://www.weeklystandard.com) to view our catalog. You may order online, by phone or by fax.

the weekly  
**Standard**

[www.weeklystandard.com](http://www.weeklystandard.com)

PHONE 1-800-388-8755 OR FAX 502-499-9187



The USS Cole and President Clinton. Agence France Presse; KRT.



# While Clinton Slept

*How Osama and Saddam got away with it.*

BY REUEL MARC GERECHT

**T**he recent revelations of North Korea's duplicity have given second life to many former Clinton officials. In force, they have hit the airwaves and the op-ed pages—all to chide the Bush administration for taking a provocative, "axis-of-evil" approach to the world's most totalitarian country. Their "realistic" policy, which attempted to bribe Pyongyang into good behavior, was, they argue, more successful since it abated a plutonium-processing crisis in 1994.

Now, in fact, it is a plausible bet that no one in the Clinton administration—with the possible exception of

Warren Christopher, who called North Korea's treaty violation "startling"—really ever believed Pyongyang would refrain for that long from developing atomic weapons. So at best, the Clintonites were buying time—ideally, waiting for the day the Pyongyang regime imploded from its Communist contradictions. Time would work, so the hopeful theory went, more against impoverished North Korea than against us.

Avoiding any possibility of war in the meantime was the overriding goal. As Christopher's successor Madeleine Albright recently explained on CNN, there may now be one Orwellian regime with a few nukes; but if the Clinton administration had not "engaged" Pyongyang, there would be dozens.



The North Korea debate is the first serious, concerted attempt by Clinton officials to restore some of the foreign policy prestige they lost after the attacks of September 11. When Osama bin Laden dismissed American power as a paper tiger, he gave pride of place to the Clinton years. Washington's quick retreat from Somalia in 1993 was a disaster for the United States. In 1996, an enormous truck-bomb exploded in Saudi Arabia. When al Qaeda attacked the embassies in Africa in 1998, Clinton responded with a barrage of cruise missiles against rock-huts in Afghanistan and a steady stream of diplomats trying to cajole the

*Reuel Marc Gerecht is a contributing editor to THE WEEKLY STANDARD and a resident fellow at the American Enterprise Institute.*

Taliban and their Pakistani supporters to do something about the Saudi holy warrior. In 2000, al Qaeda attacked the USS *Cole* in the port of Aden, and the Clinton administration did nothing except deploy a small army of federal officials to Yemen to be certain that al Qaeda was guilty.

Meanwhile, in Iraq, Saddam Hussein mocked America by his survival, growing strength, and increasing international support. The Clinton administration seemed never to understand that Saddam played a large part in diminishing the awe with which the United States had been held in the Muslim Middle East—a key component in the rise of bin Ladenism. Bill Clinton's dealings with al Qaeda, Iraq, and North Korea all showed the same debilitating problem: an aversion to the use of American power reinforced by a stultifying fear of risking American lives in combat.

Two recent books try with varying vigor to explain the Clinton administration's handling of terrorism and Iraq. Kenneth Pollack's *The Threatening Storm: The Case for Invading Iraq* and Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon's *The Age of Sacred Terror* are so far the only books by former Clinton officials to tackle head-on perhaps the two most defining and damning foreign policy questions of the Clinton years.

**T**he *Threatening Storm* is, in essence, a legal brief for why now is the time for the United States to invade Iraq. Pollack, a CIA analyst who rose quickly through Langley's ranks to join the Near Eastern affairs staff at the National Security Council in the mid-1990s, became a minor celebrity in Washington for his "rollback-fantasy" article in the January 1999 issue of *Foreign Affairs* (co-written with Daniel Byman and Gideon Rose). The essay attacked the possibility of using the Iraqi National Congress of Ahmad Chalabi to overthrow Saddam Hussein.

Though still dismissive of the military utility of the Iraqi opposition, Pollack isn't skeptical about a quick American victory over Saddam's

armed forces. *The Threatening Storm* is long, perhaps too long, in its exhausting effort to mention all the things the Clinton administration tried, short of war, to bottle up Saddam. But Pollack methodically marshals the evidence for why America's past approach to Iraq—containment through sanctions, attempted coups, military no-fly and no-drive zones, U.N. inspection teams—cannot work. Iraq is too rich, Saddam's regime is too powerful, Iraq's borders are too porous, and its neighbors are too corrupt. America's trade-hungry allies don't care, and the endless attempt at containment is probably more dangerous to America's interests in the region than war would be.

Pollack attacks the long-standing arguments for deterrence made by the French, by many within the Near Eastern Bureau of the State Department, and by more than a few antiwar realpolitik Americans. Their case is

#### **The Threatening Storm**

*The Case for Invading Iraq*

by Kenneth M. Pollack

Random House, 494 pp., \$25.95

#### **The Age of Sacred Terror**

by Daniel Benjamin and

Steven Simon

Random House, 490 pp., \$29.95

quite simple: Saddam Hussein won't egregiously misbehave again, since he knows that we would retaliate with equal or greater force. And even if Saddam got a nuke, it wouldn't give him a decisive advantage, since he would know that we (or the Israelis) would incinerate Baghdad. Saddam is ultimately checkmated, and we should calm down.

But as Pollack points out, the issue is not whether Saddam is deterrable—and Saddam's past actions suggest that he might not be—but whether the United States is. Every Western intelligence service knows that the Iraqi ruler has been trying since 1976 to build a nuclear weapon. If the Israelis hadn't bombed the Osirak reactor in 1981, and if America hadn't responded to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1990, Saddam Hussein would now have an atomic weapon. Thus the question is

"whether we would be willing to risk sacrificing New York—or Tel Aviv, or the Saudi oil fields—to save Kuwait, Jordan, or Syria." As Pollack remarks, "Saddam's foreign policy history is littered with bizarre decisions, poor judgment, and catastrophic miscalculations. . . . His track record argues that if we allow him to acquire nuclear weapons, we are likely to find ourselves in a new crisis . . . in which we will not be able to predict what he will do, and his personality and his history can only lead us to expect the worst. Leaving Saddam free to acquire nuclear weapons and then hoping that in spite of his track record he can be deterred would be a terrifically dangerous gamble."

In similar terms, Pollack demolishes covert action, the other favorite option of American foreign policy. With some discernible remorse—Pollack appears to have at one time been fond of different covert-action scenarios—he enumerates the failed coups against Saddam, including the CIA-backed coup attempt in 1996 by the Iraqi National Accord. "Today, a covert action program would be tantamount to admitting that the United States is unwilling," Pollack flatly writes, "to make the sacrifices necessary to remove Saddam's regime before it acquires the weaponry to threaten the region and the world."

**A**nd yet, despite this pro-war book, Pollack came to prominence as a critic of Washington's leading Iraq hawks. His 1999 *Foreign Affairs* essay was a somewhat mean-spirited attack on some of Clinton's most forceful Iraq critics, though it eschewed any harsh words about the president himself. Pollack and his co-writers depicted Clinton's approach to Iraq as being the only practicable policy, since the American people were obviously a debellitized lot, incapable of being persuaded by an American president to go to war. The oppositionist plans for rollback or insurrection were thus defective not just militarily but also politically. Pollack especially ridiculed the current deputy secretary of defense, Paul Wolfowitz, who was then the dean of Johns



Reuters

Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, for suggesting before Congress that the key for downing Saddam was a president's mustering "the necessary strength of purpose."

In *The Threatening Storm*, Pollack describes himself as a "moderate hawk" on Iraq throughout his government career. It's not always clear exactly what this meant inside the Clinton administration. In the company of such doves as Warren Christopher and national security adviser Anthony Lake, the firing of cruise missiles in the early morning at an empty Iraqi intelligence building could seem like a bold, bellicose act. Certainly Pollack wants to separate himself from the "extreme hawks" (including Wolfowitz, Richard Perle, the Democratic senators Bob Kerrey and Joseph Lieberman, and the editors of this magazine), who believed Saddam had to go and who all were willing to militarily support the opposition through the 1998 Iraq Liberation Act.

Still, at least Pollack and the other "moderate hawks" grasped at some level the point made by the "extremists": The Clinton administration's policy

toward Iraq was inadequate. In *The Threatening Storm*, Pollack even confesses the same point. "Ultimately," he writes, "the only real difference between the two groups of hawks was that the moderates believed that a policy of determined regime change would be so difficult and costly that senior policy makers (President Clinton in particular) would never agree to it—so they advocated an aggressive form of containment with accompanying efforts toward regime change as the best policy that was politically possible."

But despite his hawkish tendencies, Pollack tries hard to defend his Clintonite colleagues. The boy-scout quality of some of his excuses is almost endearing. For the failure of the Clinton administration's sanctions, Pollack blames "the French, Chinese, Russians, and every other country" that walked away from its commitments. "The United States made a good-faith effort to try to handle the problem of Saddam Hussein and his pursuit of weapons of mass destruction through multilateral containment." But we were betrayed by "the perfidy of others."

Is it too much to suggest that the Clinton administration should have known early on—long before 2000, when Pollack admits the administration knew the sanctions regime was Swiss cheese—that sanctions had no chance of keeping Saddam "in his box"? The moral, political, and economic nature of the Middle East, Europe, Russia, and China doomed the effort from the beginning. "Professionals" (Pollack's word) in the CIA, State Department, and NSC perhaps wanted to believe differently. Yet four years after his "rollback-fantasy" essay, the former NSC staffer still gives no hint that he is aware that the principal effect of that *Foreign Affairs* piece was to aid those in the administration who wanted to do nothing. National security adviser Sandy Berger's decision to bring Pollack back to the NSC soon after the publication of the article undoubtedly had the same stultifying intent, notwithstanding Berger's promises to Pollack that the administration needed him at the NSC to help devise a "realistic regime change policy" since the administration had decided that "the only solution" was to





topple Saddam's regime. (When Pollack tells us that Berger regularly reminded him that "we had a responsibility to leave the next administration with a viable Iraq policy, not a mess," are we permitted to giggle?)

Nowhere in *The Threatening Storm* is there an acknowledgment that the "extreme hawks" were right about Iraq much earlier than the "moderates." Pollack's account of his intellectual voyage may be genuine; he may still in 1999 have really believed in the efficacy of "reinvigorated containment." But he now ought to give credit where credit is due. The catastrophe of September 11 didn't have to lead to President Bush's "axis of evil" doctrine and the coming war with Iraq. Many of Pollack's former colleagues still can't make the connection.

Bush did make that connection, at least in part because "extreme hawks" like Paul Wolfowitz had been for years preparing the ground. Bush's ability to "muster the necessary strength of purpose" also helped. Pollack certainly helps advance a more insightful definition of an "extreme hawk": This

species includes only those who thought an American invasion of Iraq was essential at least five years before Kenneth Pollack did. This should allow the growing number of liberal converts to the anti-Saddam war cause to sleep more easily at night.

With all its faults, *The Threatening Storm* is enormously illuminating. Try as Ken Pollack may to defend his former colleagues and to diminish their Republican and neoconservative critics, his frustration with an administration that did not see the gravity in the Iraq question—or, worse, saw it but refused to act—permeates the book. Perhaps even more frustrated were Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon, the director and senior director of the counterterrorism staff on the National Security Council in 1998 and 1999.

In *The Age of Sacred Terror* Benjamin and Simon don't actually damn President Clinton as comprehensively as Pollack does. Indeed, they offer case-specific defenses of the president that are often compelling. For example, their defense of him against the Wag-

the-Dog bombing accusations during the Lewinsky travails is the definitive response to those on the left and right who assumed the worst. Their discussion of sustained Sudanese complicity with Osama bin Laden is also quite persuasive, and leads one to believe that the president was in fact too restrained in targeting the Sudanese in 1998. And they reveal that Clinton had a sincere and bureaucratically active interest in the threat from bioterrorism. (It would be nice to know how much Richard Clarke, the Clinton administration's counterterrorism czar, a man of wide-ranging dark curiosity, propelled that interest.)

But try as Benjamin and Simon do in *Sacred Terror* to defend some senior officials from charges of incompetence—the defense of their immediate boss, Clarke, rings true, while their defense of the dovish Anthony Lake sounds off-key—their often-detailed discussions of various bureaucratic counterterrorist victories inevitably leave one with the impression that the upper reaches of the Clinton administration, especially the president, really



CORBIS

didn't want to invest themselves seriously in the counterterrorist issue.

Benjamin and Simon's scathing discussion of negligence at the FBI, and disinterest and operational incompetence at the CIA, also leaves one wondering: If the FBI and CIA directors were running fundamentally dysfunctional institutions, and there was an awareness in the upper reaches of the executive branch that not all was well in these organizations, then who is to blame for allowing these institutions to be so defective?

*Sacred Terror* is well written and thoughtful—its commentary on the evolution of modern Islamic radicalism is a near-masterpiece—and, as in all first-rate books, the clarity of the prose and the story works against sentiment. Benjamin and Simon assign blame as astutely as anyone has, far more cogently than the official bipartisan commission probably ever will. They sum it up well:

In the first World Trade Center bombing and the other conspiracies of the early 1990s, the nation's intelligence and law-enforcement

authorities and its political leaders were put on notice that a new brand of terrorism that aimed at mass casualties had arisen. The threat was made more palpable by the embassy bombings, the millennium conspiracies, and the bombing of the *Cole*, which taken together demonstrated that the United States had a persistent opponent determined to carry out mass-casualty attacks. It is true that between the understanding of that threat and the reality of four planes being used as missiles there is a chasm of incomprehension. But the government failed not because it did not foresee the exact mode of attack. It failed because it did not act against an opponent it knew would like to kill large numbers of Americans, and because it was not alert enough to the signs of an impending operation.

Though Benjamin and Simon don't blame President Clinton for not attacking Afghanistan, the overall effect of *Sacred Terror* is to condemn him. Terrorists blowing up American embassies and a Navy ship are always sufficient causes for the United States to go to war. It is a decent bet that Clinton could have rallied the nation for an

attack on bin Laden and the Taliban in Afghanistan. It is a decent bet that if he had, Al Gore would now be president.

Rallying the Democratic party's political class in Washington, of course, would have been an entirely different matter. Even after September 11, a big slice of Washington's Democratic elite still can't stomach the idea of war against Iraq. Indeed, such prominent Democrats as Tom Daschle, Barbara Boxer, Nancy Pelosi, and Edward Kennedy make Clinton administration officials seem like robust Iraq hawks.

The war on terror, the coming invasion of Iraq, and the imbroglio in North Korea will surely reveal whether the core of the Democratic party can ever understand that, given the enemies we face, a bit more American bellicosity would be a virtue, not a vice. We would all certainly be better off if the Democrats could occasionally outflank the Republican party to the right on national security. For one thing, it would help keep the Bush administration honest on North Korea. ♦



# History as Bigotry

*Daniel Goldhagen slanders the Catholic Church.*

BY DAVID G. DALIN

In its January 21, 2002, issue, the *New Republic* devoted twenty-four pages to Daniel Jonah Goldhagen's "What Would Jesus Have Done?"—one of the most virulent attacks against the Roman Catholic Church ever printed in a major American publication. Last fall, Goldhagen expanded that essay into a book, a curious and furious production entitled *A Moral Reckoning: The Role of the Catholic Church in the Holocaust*

**A Moral Reckoning**  
*The Role of the Catholic Church in the Holocaust and Its Unfulfilled Duty of Repair*  
by Daniel Jonah Goldhagen  
Knopf, 362 pp., \$25

*and Its Unfulfilled Duty of Repair*, about the Vatican's role during the Holocaust.

Goldhagen is no stranger to controversy. His 1996 *Hitler's Willing Executioners* argued that blame for the Holocaust should be placed on *all* Germans—for "eliminationist" anti-Semitism was widely spread among prewar Germans and intrinsic to the German character. The Nazi exterminations could occur because the vast majority of Germans were already predisposed to kill Jews. Though Goldhagen gained international celebrity, his book's simplistic argument was widely criticized by serious scholars and historians.

In *A Moral Reckoning*, Goldhagen's argument is, once again, simplistic. It's dishonest and misleading as well. He identifies Christianity, and particularly the Catholic Church, as the preeminent source of anti-Semitism in the world—ancient, medieval, and modern. While indicting Pius XII as an anti-Semite and a collaborator with Nazi Germany—and ignoring any contradictory

evidence—Goldhagen goes on to attribute anti-Semitism to the entire Catholic Church and its leadership, even the present-day Church under John Paul II.

Indeed, the book is so flawed—its facts error-prone, its arguments tendentious, and its conclusion, equating Christianity in its essence with anti-Semitism, both bizarre and dangerous—that most scholars in the field have simply tried to ignore it.

*Hitler's Willing Executioners* sold very well and was widely praised in its early reviews. *A Moral Reckoning*, however, has flopped badly, despite a large publicity effort by which the publisher Knopf tried to recoup its advance. More prepared this time, reviewers have also been considerably less kind to Goldhagen, and the reviews have generally run from lukewarm to outraged. In the *Sunday Times*, the British historian Michael Burleigh held his nose long enough to brand the book "vile" and "a strip cartoon view of European history."

Despite my fury at Goldhagen's misuse of the Holocaust to advance an anti-Catholic agenda, I had hoped to join the vast conspiracy of silence in which most Holocaust scholars have, delicately and politely, pretended that *A Moral Reckoning* doesn't exist. But the book hasn't quite disappeared with the same speed with which, say, H.G. Wells's 1943 *Crux Ansata: An Indictment of the Roman Catholic Church* fell down the memory hole. Rather, *A Moral Reckoning*—like Paul Blanshard's 1949 diatribe *American Freedom and Catholic Power*—is carving a permanent niche for itself out on the far edges of American culture.



Pius XII

Hulton Getty. All others: Paulist Press.

Where Blanshard was a much-reprinted staple for the old anti-Catholic Evangelical world, Goldhagen seems to be turning into a staple for leftists whose hatred of Catholicism derives from the Church's opposition to abortion and the rest of the liberationist agenda. The huge outpouring of books in recent years attacking the wartime pontiff Pius XII—from John Cornwell's *Hitler's Pope* to Garry Wills's *Papal Sin*—were bad enough (and Goldhagen, who seems in *A Moral Reckoning* never to have consulted anything except secondary sources, relies heavily upon them). But when Goldhagen extends that attack to the demand that the Catholic Church, as we know it, be abolished as a disgrace and a danger to us all, he establishes a new marker for just how bad it can get—and the maddened anti-Catholics have responded by taking him to their breast, for his diatribe is more vicious and extreme than that of any other recent papal critic.

With all that in mind, it is perhaps worth putting on record some of the failings of *A Moral Reckoning*. Indeed, Goldhagen invites the reader to "acknowledge the incontrovertible facts and plain truths contained in this book." It's an invitation he shouldn't have issued. In the June/July 2002 issue

*Rabbi David G. Dalin, a visiting fellow at Princeton University's James Madison Program, is working on a book about Pius XII, John Paul II, and the Jews.*



of *First Things*, Ronald J. Rychlak published an extensive and damning list of errors in the *New Republic* article—astonishingly few of which Goldhagen has bothered to correct.

So, for instance, the establishment of the Jewish ghetto in Rome, one of the tragic milestones in the history of Catholic-Jewish relations, took place in 1556, not in 1555; the Venice ghetto in 1517, not 1516; the Frankfurt ghetto in 1462, not 1460; the Vienna ghetto in 1626, not 1570. It's not that these are particularly important errors, but that they are *simple* errors—easy to look up, easy to check. You can't trust anything Goldhagen reports. He is off by three decades about the beginning of the process for Pius XII's beatification and misidentifies the role of Peter Gumpel (who is not the "advocate" but the independent judge of Pius's cause). He claims that Pius XII neither reproached nor punished Franciscan friar Miroslav Filipovic-Majstorovic, when, actually, the so-called "Brother Satan" was tried, defrocked, and expelled from the Franciscan order before the war ended (and was killed by the Communists shortly after).

Then there's the caption that identifies a photo as "Cardinal Michael Faulhaber marches between rows of SA men at a Nazi rally in Munich"—except that the man in the picture isn't Faulhaber but the papal nuncio Cesare Orsenigo, the city isn't Munich but Berlin, and the parade isn't a Nazi rally but a May Day parade. Oh, and the fact that the irascible Faulhaber was a famous opponent of the Nazis. In October, a German court prevented publication of *A Moral Reckoning* until the slander against Faulhaber was corrected.

On and on the factual errors go, the sloppy handling of dates, persons, and places all culminating in the selective use (or ignoring) of evidence to portray Eugenio Pacelli (later Pius XII) as the fount of the era's anti-Semitism. Relying entirely on *Hitler's Pope*, Goldhagen takes what was already an outrageous misreading of a 1919 letter (sent by Pacelli to Rome while serving as papal nuncio in Bavaria) describing a



Pius XII visits San Lorenzo Church in Rome after it was damaged by Allied bombs (1943).

group of Bolshevik revolutionaries who had led an uprising in Munich—which Goldhagen extends to: "The Communist revolutionaries, Pacelli averred in this letter, were 'all' Jews."

The Holy See's 1933 concordat with Germany has long been a key instrument for critics of Pius XII, and indeed there are grounds on which to criticize it. But Goldhagen can't accept mere criticism: "Nazi Germany's first great diplomatic triumph," he has to label it, forgetting that the Four Powers Pact between Germany, France, Italy, and England preceded it, as did League of Nations recognition. Pacelli's concordat "helped to legitimate the Nazi regime in the eyes of the world and consolidate its power at home," Goldhagen insists.

But soon after the concordat was signed, Pacelli wrote two articles in the Vatican newspaper, *L'Osservatore Romano*, unequivocally arguing that the Church had negotiated a treaty and nothing more—a treaty that implied no moral endorsement of Hitler or Nazism. While it's true that Hitler initially thought he would be able to use the concordat to harness the Church, he soon came to regret it—as his frenzied diatribes in his *Table Talk* reveal—precisely because it was being cited by Catholics as a legal basis on which to resist Nazism.

Goldhagen's efforts to portray Pacelli as a man whose whole life was fueled by anti-Semitism are made possible only by his ignoring all evidence to the contrary. Guido Mendes, a prominent Italian physician and Pacelli's lifelong Jewish friend, is never mentioned by Goldhagen. Nor is the fact that when Mendes lost his medical professorship as a result of Fascist anti-Semitism, Pacelli personally intervened on his behalf. With Pacelli's direct assistance, Mendes and his family were able to escape and eventually settle in Israel. Pacelli was instrumental in drafting the Vatican's historic 1916 condemnation of anti-Semitism. Bruno Walter, the brilliant Jewish conductor of the Munich Opera whom Pacelli befriended shortly after arriving in Munich in 1917, recounts that Pacelli helped free Walter's Jewish fellow musician, Ossip Gabrilowitsch, who had been imprisoned during a pogrom. These facts are also never mentioned in Goldhagen's one-sided polemic.

Goldhagen's centerpiece is the outrageous allegation that Pius XII "did not lift a finger to forfend the deportations of the Jews of Rome" or of other parts of Italy "by instructing his priests and nuns to give the hunted Jewish men, women and children sanctuary." Much of this is lifted straight from anti-Pius books like Susan Zuccotti's



*Pius XII records his 1943 Christmas message for peace.*

*Under His Very Windows*—and thus Goldhagen repeats the errors of those books and adds extras, all his own, in his determined attempt to extend their thesis into over-the-top railings against the sheer existence of Catholicism.

Goldhagen is apparently unaware (or, more probably, doesn't care) that many distinguished scholars have declared Zuccotti's book "not history but guesswork," as the historian Owen Chadwick put it. Zuccotti's principal charge, mindlessly repeated by Goldhagen, is that there is no credible evidence that Pius XII ever explicitly ordered his subordinates to assist Jews in Italy. In fact, there is a whole body of evidence that proves Pius did. In 1964 Cardinal Paolo Dezza, the wartime rector of the Pontifical Gregorian University, published a signed article stating unequivocally that during the German occupation of Rome, Pius XII explicitly told him to help "persecuted Jews" and do so "most willingly." In his 2001 book *Gli ebrei salvati da Pio XII*, Antonio Gaspari compiles additional testimonies. And more recently, Gaspari came across new documents, establishing that as early as 1940 Pius XII explicitly ordered his secretary of state, Luigi Maglione, and Maglione's assistant, Giovanni Battista Montini (the future Paul VI), to send money to Jews protected by the bishop of Campagna.

The Nazi deportations of Italy's Jews began in October 1943. Pope Pius

ordered churches and convents throughout Italy to shelter Jews, and in Rome itself 155 convents and monasteries sheltered five thousand Jews throughout the German occupation. Pius himself granted sanctuary within the walls of the Vatican, and his summer residence at Castel Gandolfo, to countless homeless Jews. Goldhagen's book conspicuously lacks any discussion of Castel Gandolfo, which enjoys a unique place in the annals of Jewish rescue (and Catholic rescuers) during the Holocaust: In no other site in all of Nazi-occupied Europe were as many Jews saved and sheltered for as long a period.

The recently released memoirs of Adolf Eichmann also contain new evidence disproving Goldhagen's claim. The memoirs confirm that Vatican protests played a crucial part in obstructing Nazi intentions for Roman Jews. Eichmann wrote that the Vatican "vigorously protested the arrest of Jews, requesting the interruption of such action." At Eichmann's trial in Jerusalem, Israeli attorney general Gideon Hausner said, "the pope himself intervened personally in support of the Jews of Rome." Documents introduced at the trial provide further evidence of Vatican efforts to halt the arrest and deportation of Roman Jews.

No accusation is too preposterous for Goldhagen to accept. Commenting on the Vatican's alleged link to Nazi war criminals, he claims that Alois Hudal, an Austrian prelate and Nazi

sympathizer, was "an important Catholic bishop at the Vatican," as well as a "close friend" and "confidant" of Pius XII. Indeed, he adds, both Pius XII and the future Paul VI actively supported Hudal in his criminal assistance to fleeing Nazi war criminals.

As it happens, Alois Hudal was never a bishop "at the Vatican," much less an "important" one, but rather an obscure rector of the Collegio dell' Anima in Rome, where he was placed to confine him to a post of little significance. Hudal also was never a "close friend" of Pius XII or Montini. In fact, Hudal's memoirs bitterly attack the Vatican for steadfastly refusing an alliance with Nazi Germany to combat "godless Bolshevism." Far from assisting Nazi war criminals in their escape, Pius XII authorized the American Jesuit Edmund Walsh to submit to the War Crimes Tribunal at Nuremberg a dossier documenting Nazi war crimes and atrocities. The recent book by David Alvarez, *Spies in the Vatican: Espionage & Intrigue from Napoleon to the Holocaust*, shows how much Hitler distrusted and despised Pius XII.

Goldhagen's virulent *A Moral Reckoning* focuses on Pius XII as the symbol of Catholic evil and repeats almost every accusation, including the most discredited ones, that has ever been leveled against him. But Goldhagen doesn't limit his anti-Catholic diatribe to Pius. Indeed, the point of all the Holocaust material in *A Moral Reckoning* seems to be the concluding pages' attack on John Paul II and the Catholic Church today. Though Goldhagen begrudgingly acknowledges John Paul II's extraordinary efforts to bring Catholics and Jews closer together, he immediately takes this praise back and ultimately contradicts himself entirely by accusing John Paul II of tolerating "anti-Semitic libels and hatreds" during his visit to Syria in the spring of 2001.

Goldhagen claims that "neither John Paul II nor any other Pope has seen fit to make . . . a direct and forceful public statement about Catholics' culpability and the need for all the members of the Church who have

sinned during the Holocaust to repent for their many different kinds of offenses and sins against Jews.” On the contrary: John Paul II has frequently repented and apologized publicly. In his very first papal audience with Jewish leaders, on March 12, 1979, John Paul II reaffirmed the Second Vatican Council’s repudiation of anti-Semitism “as opposed to the very spirit of Christianity,” and “which in any case the dignity of the human person alone would suffice to condemn.” During his 1986 visit to Rome’s chief synagogue—the first time any reigning pope entered a synagogue—John Paul II publicly acknowledged and apologized for the Church’s sins. Insisting that there was no theological justification for discrimination, he apologized to the Roman Jews in attendance (many of whom were Holocaust survivors), declaring that the Church condemns anti-Semitism “by anyone—I repeat: by anyone.” In 1994, at the personal initiative of John Paul II, the Vatican established diplomatic relations with Israel. In 1998, the Church issued *We Remember: A Reflection on the Shoah*, an official document on the Holocaust. And in 2000, the pope made his historic visit to Israel—one of the great legacies of his pontificate, which has done much to further Catholic-Jewish reconciliation.

But Goldhagen can acknowledge none of this. He identifies Christianity itself as the source of anti-Semitism and declares, “the main responsibility for producing the all-time leading Western hatred lies with Christianity. More specifically, with the Catholic Church.” The definition of Jews as Christ-killers, claims Goldhagen, goes back to the origins of Christianity. Indeed, it is still central to Catholic thought today, and it has an “obvious integral relationship to the genesis of the Holocaust.”

As the Jewish scholar Michael Berenbaum has noted, Goldhagen “omits all mention of the countervailing traditions of tolerance” within Roman Catholic thought, past and present. He also misrepresents the thought of those early Church leaders who advocated a tolerant attitude

toward the Jews. Goldhagen’s misrepresentation of St. Augustine’s views of Jews and Judaism is especially appalling. As Ronald Rychlak has noted, Goldhagen’s exposition on St. Augustine “is little more than a crude and contemptuous canard.” Similarly, Goldhagen’s unsubstantiated claim that “there is no difference in kind between the Church’s ‘anti-Judaism’ and its off-shoot European anti-Semitism” is as unsubtle a statement as

someone who claims to be a historian could possibly make.

In short, Daniel Jonah Goldhagen’s polemic against Pius XII, John Paul II, and the Catholic Church fails to meet even the minimum standards of scholarship. That the book has found its readership out in the fever swamps of anti-Catholicism isn’t surprising. But that a mainstream publisher like Knopf would print the thing is an intellectual and publishing scandal. ♦



# Prince of the City

*Rudy Giuliani explains how he did it.*

BY FRED SIEGEL

**S**ir Rudy Giuliani has become such a commanding figure that the reviewers of his book *Leadership* have spent far more space on his persona than his policies. The reviews almost invariably buy into the line about 9/11 bringing forth “a new Rudy.” The “new Rudy” idea was originally a creation of his critics, who were having a hard time reconciling their distaste for both the style and substance of his mayoralty with Giuliani’s heroic leadership in the face of an enemy attack.

The “new Rudy” talk takes two, somewhat unrelated, forms. One, drawing on his marital and medical troubles, insists, with some small justice, that he had become kinder and gentler. The other claims that 9/11 rescued his mayoralty from obscurity. In the words of *BusinessWeek*, “If not for his actions in the days after the attacks, the former New York mayor might have been remembered as much for his extramarital behavior and battle with cancer as for his performance in office.” Here, as the latest murder statistics testify, there’s barely a grain of truth. While murder is on the rise again around big-

city America, it continues to decline in New York.

The Giuliani mayoralty was defined by continuity of vision and managerial style. It was framed by the two attacks on the World Trade Center. *Leadership* doesn’t mention it, but in Giuliani’s first inaugural speech given in January 1994, pride of place went to the February 1993 attack on the World Trade Center. The newly installed mayor praised the police, fire, and nursing rescuers, and described the city’s response to the terror attack as a model for the city’s self-reliant future. It was a moment, he said, when “50,000 New Yorkers took charge of themselves and each other, showing on their own even before any city worker could help them . . . the New York spirit that brought us through the World Trade Center crisis.” The response was “a demonstration of the courage and ingenuity we must apply to: restoring public safety, saving our schools, creating jobs, controlling our budget deficit and improving the quality of our lives.” Only after these comments did he turn to another emergency, crime.

If the city’s response to crises was on his mind from the very start, so were his methods in tackling emergencies. The reviews have largely overlooked what is

**Leadership**  
by Rudolph W. Giuliani  
Miramax Books, 407 pp., \$25.95

*Fred Siegel is a professor at the Cooper Union for Science and Art in New York.*



both the most obvious and most striking thing about *Leadership*. How is it that a mayor—cities have long been synonymous with mismanagement—was presuming to give management advice to America's world-leading business magnates?

The easy answer, noted by *Newsweek*, is that *Leadership* was written as “a calling card” for his consulting business “Giuliani Partners.” True enough, but it misses the open secret of his book. Giuliani has been a keen student of management. The ex-mayor is not an intellectual, but he is, like former President Clinton, a formidable intellect, a natural student of whatever subject he tackles who is capable of quickly absorbing and organizing a vast array of material.

Study is the leitmotif of both *Leadership* and Giuliani's career. He went to Washington as an associate deputy attorney general in 1975, and has described it as “a terrific opportunity. I thought it would be a seminar on how government works.” When his mentor Judge Lloyd MacMahon handed him the receivership of a bituminous coal mine in Kentucky, he used his quickly acquired knowledge of mining to win over hostile miners who had begun by asking, “Are you a Jew?”

After his narrow defeat in the 1989 mayoral election, he spent two years studying city government in preparation for taking office. He had begun *Leadership* months before the 9/11 attack. He writes that “it had become almost a seminar for me, a self-imposed program on how to run an organization. It was as if God had provided an opportunity to design a course in leadership just when I needed it most.”

“A leader,” insists Giuliani, “should have independently acquired understanding of the areas he oversees. Anybody who's going to take on a large organization must put time aside for deep study.” He also contends that leaders have to know enough to fit all the specialized advice they receive into a coherent whole. This is true, but hardly earthshaking, even if its wisdom seems to have eluded Giuliani's successor Michael Bloomberg.

The book doesn't begin to capture the fiery intensity of Giuliani's leadership that served as a beacon for the people who worked for him. Nor, aside from the numerous references to the morally ambiguous management techniques illustrated by *The Godfather* movies, does the reader get a sense of Giuliani's intuitive grasp of the underside of urban life.

Like all management books, *Leadership* has a good deal of hindsight and common sense dressed up as foresight. Public officials and business executives all over the country have turned the book into a bestseller because, the padding and self-flattery aside, it gives the reader a good sense of how Giuliani operated. He writes, “I've begun every single morning since 1981,” when he was appointed the youngest associate attorney general ever, “with a meeting of my top staff.” The importance of the “morning meeting cannot be overstated.” With the chief executive and his top staff all gathered, “everyone is entitled to air concerns, that meant my staff knew they could get a yes or no from the boss . . . the access worked both ways.” And with the different department heads gathered together around the table, it was hard, if not impossible, to engage in blame-shifting.

“The entire 9/11 response and recovery,” says Giuliani, who was expecting a second attack, “was planned at the morning meetings expanded to include Governor Pataki's staff, representatives from utilities and the Federal Emergency Management Agency.” Baltimore's innovative mayor, Democrat Martin O'Malley, has taken this lesson to heart. He has been similarly drawing together his top staff, so that, guided by timely statistics, he can impose accountability on his commissioners.

The book does little to account for the mix of instinct and intelligence that makes for a natural leader. Whether the subject has been corporate corruption, as when he zealously prosecuted Wall Street malfeasance in the 1980s, his decision to shun Arafat at a time when the Palestinian leader had been accorded a measure of respectability, or his

crucial decision in the mid-1990s to emphasize emergency management when most of the country was on “a vacation from history,” Giuliani has been ahead of the curve.

But his Office of Emergency Management, which pioneered urban crisis management and made possible the extraordinary success in evacuating 25,000 people on 9/11, is not even mentioned in the two books written on Giuliani to date. The mayor's decision to establish an emergency command center was roundly mocked at the time as overkill. The *New York Times* derided it as Rudy's “bunker,” former mayor Koch called the idea “nuts,” and the Rudyphobes (and even some admirers) were derisive. The city council tried to eliminate it.

The location of the emergency operations command post in the World Trade Center was a mistake, but the Office of Emergency Management that built the center proved an enormous success. Designed to prepare for “hybrid emergencies” (such as the possibility of biological or chemical attack), the Emergency Office's sole purpose, since copied by other cities, is to coordinate the city's numerous agencies in responding to a crisis. It got in its practice runs reacting to the West Nile virus, Y2K, and the Millennium Celebration. “For months,” Giuliani says, “we had in place an exercise in which we'd drilled on our response to a biochemical attack, specifically practicing for the distribution of medication—that planned date Wed. 9/12.” The location was Pier 92 in the Hudson River, which was then turned into the emergency command post when the Towers went down.

*Leadership* isn't always a good read. It's disjointed. The book jumps from one, often disconnected anecdote, to another organized under the loose rubric of topics like “Loyalty,” “Prepare Relentlessly,” or “Be Your Own Man.” But for those interested in the thinking behind the success of the most effective mayor of the last half century, a mayor whose thinking remained remarkably constant through his eight years, *Leadership* is well worth the effort. ♦



## Contributing to the Debate



In the first years of THE WEEKLY STANDARD, we had a policy that no book by anyone on the masthead would be reviewed. It seemed sensible at the time: a way to avoid dedicating every-other week's review section to contributing editor P.J.

O'Rourke, who was publishing comic masterpieces at a rate only slightly faster than the average person can read.

But our friends keep scribbling away, writing major and important works—and not just our contributing editors: Senior editor Christopher Caldwell, for instance, recently co-edited with Christopher Hitchens a superb collection of essays called *Left Hooks, Right Crosses: A Decade of Political Writing* (Thunder's Mouth, 352 pp., \$16.95). It has begun to seem absurd that we're the only magazine that can't comment on all this writing, apart from a small "Book of the Week" plug. Are we really prohibited

from mentioning that Joseph Epstein will publish in the next few months both a story collection with the perfect title *Fabulous Small Jews* and a book-length essay called *Envy*?

It may be, of course, that our contributing editors don't actually need our praise. We notice, with some irritation, that David Frum's *The Right Man: The Surprise Presidency of George W. Bush* (Random House, 303 pp., \$25.95) didn't wait for our approval before reaching the bestseller list.

A well-told and fast-reading account of Frum's year working in the White House, *The Right Man* is particularly good on the way in which the attacks of September 11 crystallized into actuality all the best of Bush's potential—a potential many commentators had denied the president had. The "surprise presidency" of Frum's subtitle refers not to Bush's election, but to the stature he revealed when events demanded it.

Frum begins his book with the first words he chanced to hear in the White House—one staffer saying to another, "Missed you at Bible study"—and builds from that opening a clear picture of the seriousness of the Bush staff and the moral

courage granted to the president by his faith. The first book to appear by anyone who has participated in the administration, *The Right Man* paints Bush not as a brilliant man—but as a clear and good man.

Shortly to join Frum on the best-seller list, we trust, is contributing editor Robert Kagan's just-published *Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order* (Knopf, 103 pp., \$18), an expansion of his widely discussed *Policy Review* essay on the contrasting American and European visions of international order.

Kagan notes that international law has always been a tool militarily weak nations use to attempt to curb strong nations. The struggle of relatively weak Europe in recent years to impose international treaties, courts, and supra-national organizations on the United States is only the latest example of an old, old pattern. The pivotal location of Western Europe in the struggle of the Cold War long obscured this fact, but it is obvious now—or, rather, obvious once Kagan points it out.

Unfortunately, Kagan observes, the difference between America and Europe is rapidly hardening into a permanent divide—not merely a jockeying for position, of the kind that world history has always known, but a complete and perhaps novel disagreement about what nations and power are for. Americans these days are from Mars, and Europeans from Venus.

This is not a promising situation. Arguing that "Europe is not really capable of constraining the United States," Kagan understands what led Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld to dismiss France and Germany as "old Europe." But, as *Of Paradise and Power* shows, Kagan also understands that we must not sever—or allow the Europeans to sever—our ties to the set of common Western beliefs.

—J. Bottum


**"While the War Party spits out tired insults about Gallic Weakness, Paris seems to us a wise ally, trying to prevent an old friend from acting against her deeper interests."**

—*Editorial in the American Conservative, a magazine edited by Patrick J. Buchanan*

# Parody

## *The Paris Years*

by Simone de Simon



Perhaps the happiest days of my life were spent on the Left Bank, studying with the great French intellectuals Jean-Paul Sartre and Patrique Le Buchanan. They were an odd pair, the wall-eyed Sartre and the flamboyant Patrique. I used to see Patrique late at night at the legendary café Pas de Juifs, smoking Gitanes and reading Nietzsche. In those days—for this was after his riding crop period—he favored ruffled purple blouses and a flowing velour cape with a vivid red lining stained with sherry.

I would approach Patrique and we would discuss philosophy: "If a tree falls in the forest, does it make a noise?"

"Is it a neocon tree?" he would reply elliptically.

Sartre liked to discuss his days in the Resistance, of which there were two, while this would send Patrique into a rage, for he of course still wept at the sight of tall leather boots. Patrique then would complain of a feeling of nausea, incited by the hopelessness of existence and the futility of will, though later in life he discovered that Pepto-Bismol cleared this right up.

Sometimes Patrique would take us down to the waterfront to establish solidarity with the workers, though most nights they would just beat him up and steal his scooter. Still, his journal, *La Pitchforque*, was an unbending champion of the peasant class, calling for high tariffs on apéritifs and croissants. It was also quick to embrace surrealism, and featured nightmarish visions of a dystopian alternate universe, called MSNBC, which deadened readers' senses and caused them to doubt the existence of God.

During his later days, of course, Patrique fell under the spell of Lacan and, because of a typo in one of Lacan's later works, came to believe that when human beings died they were reincarnated as parlor furniture. Many of his disciples left him as a result of his habit of screaming, "Get off that divan! Can't you see you're hurting her!" But I still liked to visit him occasionally, and bring him news of the defeats and humiliations of the American hyperpower in an effort to cheer him up.